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ABSTRACT 
Decision making is a cognitive process of selecting a course of action or 
belief among multiple alternative choices. However, pressures of time, 
circumstance or unappreciated wickedness can create a situation where an 
ostensibly illogical choice overtakes rational decision making. Sometimes, when 
evaluated by those considered experts, decisions made in disasters seem 
irrational, harmful, or iniquitous in nature. 
A cognitive bias known as the Dunning-Kruger effect posits that 
individuals who lack the necessary skills to make rational decisions can also lack 
the metacognitive ability to realize that their decision making is flawed. The 
Dunning-Kruger theory theorizes this can result in the individual exhibiting 
overconfidence to adequately address the threat. Essentially, the unskilled are 
unaware and overconfident.  
This thesis investigates the occurrence of the Dunning-Kruger effect in 
individual decision making during disasters. The author analyzed 12 indicators by 
coding interview transcripts of disaster survivors. This thesis includes two case 
studies: Hurricane Katrina, representing a natural disaster, and the World Trade 
Center attacks, exemplifying a human-caused disaster. In each case, 30 
transcripts of survivors were reviewed, and Dunning-Kruger indicators were 
present in both case studies.  
How individuals process realized or perceived threat is important for 
homeland security policy makers. Future research should be conducted to better 
understand how Dunning-Kruger effects influence disaster decision making.   
vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1 
A. PROBLEM SPACE ........................................................................ 1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ................................................................ 6 
C. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY ................................ 7 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................... 7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................... 11 
A. THREAT ....................................................................................... 11 
B. DISASTER DECISION-MAKING CONCEPTS ............................. 12 
1. Chaos Theory ................................................................... 14 
2. Rational Choice ................................................................ 16 
3. Bounded Rationality ........................................................ 17 
4. Immeasurability of Choice .............................................. 18 
5. Cognitive and Decision Illusion ...................................... 19 
6. Disaster Decision-Making Frameworks .......................... 20 
C. DUNNING-KRUGER THEORY AND APPLIED WORK ............... 21 
1. Dunning-Kruger ............................................................... 21 
2. Threat Convergence ........................................................ 22 
3. Fear Appeal ...................................................................... 22 
4. Social Cognitive ............................................................... 24 
5. Simple and Hard Choices ................................................ 26 
6. Enhancing Decision Making ........................................... 27 
7. Approaches to Minimize Poor Decision Making ............ 29 
D. SUMMARY ................................................................................... 31 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................. 33 
A. METHOD ...................................................................................... 33 
B. DATA COLLECTION ................................................................... 34 
C. PROCEDURE .............................................................................. 35 
D. ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................... 40 
E. LIMITATIONS AND BIAS ............................................................ 41 
F. SUMMARY ................................................................................... 43 
IV. CASE STUDY HURRICANE KATRINA .................................................. 45 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 45 
B. DATA ........................................................................................... 46 
C. ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 50 
viii 
D. DISCUSSION ............................................................................... 51 
E. SUMMARY ................................................................................... 55 
V. CASE STUDY WORLD TRADE CENTER .............................................. 57 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 57 
B. DATA ........................................................................................... 60 
C. ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 63 
D. DISCUSSION ............................................................................... 65 
E. SUMMARY ................................................................................... 70 
VI. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS ............................................................... 71 
A. DISCUSSION OF HURRICANE KATRINA AND WORLD 
TRADE CENTER CASES ............................................................ 71 
B. SUMMARY ................................................................................... 73 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................ 75 
D. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 77 
APPENDIX.  INDICATORS OF THE DUNNING-KRUGER EFFECT ................. 79 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................... 81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ........................................................................... 91 
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Coding of Indicators to Measure the Dunning-Kruger Effect ......... 37 
Figure 2. Satellite Photo of Hurricane Katrina .............................................. 46 
Figure 3. Photo of the World Trade Center Attacks on September 11, 
2001 ............................................................................................. 59 
 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1. Methodological Approach ............................................................. 34 
Table 2. Research Domain, Indicator and Indicator Definition .................... 38 
Table 3. Case Study Hurricane Katrina: Numerical Representation of 
Data ............................................................................................. 47 
Table 4. Case Study Hurricane Katrina: Sum, and Distribution of Data 
for Each Indicator ......................................................................... 49 
Table 5. Case Study, World Trade Center: Numerical Representation 
of Data.......................................................................................... 61 
Table 6. Case Study World Trade Center: Sum, and Distribution of 
Data for Each Indicator ................................................................. 63 
Table 7. Coded Indicators of Hurricane Katrina and WTC  Respondent 
Data ............................................................................................. 71 
Table 8. Times at Least One Indicator Was Identified ................................ 72 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
DK Dunning-Kruger 
DKE Dunning-Kruger effect 
HDMB Hurricane Digital Memory Bank 
RPD recognition prime decision 
SCT social cognitive theory 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Decision making is a cognitive process of selecting a course of action or 
belief among multiple alternative choices. Each decision results in a sequence of 
behaviors or activities the decider deems satisfactory, beneficial, or in her or his 
best interest.1 However, disasters can create chaos, wickedness, and pressures 
of time or circumstance that bound a person’s decision-making capability.  
Many poor decisions connected with threats are a result of cognitive bias.2 
One cognitive bias known as the Dunning-Kruger effect suggests that, “People 
who lack the knowledge or wisdom to perform well are often unaware of this 
fact.”3 In addition, theory on the effect posits, “the same incompetence that leads 
them to make wrong choices also deprives them of the savvy necessary to 
recognize competence, be it their own or anyone else’s.”4 Sometimes this results 
in an overconfidence of skills relative to capability. 
As it is important for homeland security policy makers to understand how 
an individual processes a realized or perceived threat, this thesis investigates if 
indicators of Dunning-Kruger effects are present in individuals during disasters 
when choice is also available. It also offers future research opportunities to better 
understand how Dunning-Kruger effects influence disaster decision making. 
_________________________ 
1 Robert Duncan Luce, “Rationality in Choice under Certainty and Uncertainty,” in 
Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research, ed. Sandra L. Schneider and 
James Shanteau (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64–83. 
2 Committee on Measuring Human Capabilities: Performance Potential of Individuals and 
Collectives; Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences; Division of Behavioral and 
Social Sciences and Education; National Research Council. Measuring Human Capabilities: An 
Agenda for Basic Research on the Assessment of Individual and Group Performance Potential for 
Military Accession (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2015), 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/19017, 53. 
3 Justin Kruger and David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in 
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” Journal of 




A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis answers the question, “Are there indications of Dunning-Kruger 
effects in individuals who encountered natural or human-caused disasters?” 
Though this research specifically examines Dunning-Kruger indicators 
suggestive for the presence or absence of the effect, it does not measure the 
extent of the effect. 
B. METHOD AND DESIGN 
This research used qualitative research design to answer the research 
question. Two case studies were included as exemplars of significant disaster 
threat. Hurricane Katrina represented natural disaster and signified disaster with 
warning. The attacks on the World Trade Center exemplified human-caused 
disaster and epitomized disaster without warning. In each case study, 30 
transcripts of survivors were examined for indicators of the Dunning-Kruger 
effect. 
A total of 12 indicators were chosen and coded into three domains 
(incompetence, lack of metacognition, and illusionary superiority). Every indicator 
need not be identified for the effect to be present. For the effect to be coded as 
present, at least one indicator in each domain must be identified. The procedure 
included the researcher reading the transcripts, making notes regarding first 
impressions, and checking to see if the case studies satisfy inclusion criteria. 
Next, words, phrases, sentences, or relevant sections were coded according to 
the 12 indicators. Finally, researcher collated and classified the data in a 
spreadsheet for analysis. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Decision making in the context of disaster has a multitude of factors 
influencing human behavior. Often, seemingly rational thought is constrained by 
the circumstances surrounding disaster and allows decisions to appear irrational, 
harmful, or iniquitous. This research confirms the presence of the Dunning-
xvii 
Kruger effect in both cases studied. While the extent of the effect’s impact was 
not measured, a high prevalence (73 percent) of survivors of natural disaster 
showed positive indicators of Dunning-Kruger effects. For human-caused 
disaster, 47 percent of respondents met the established criteria for the Dunning-
Kruger effect.  
The cases studied also represent disaster with prior warning (natural) and 
disaster without warning (human caused). It is possible that Dunning-Kruger 
effects increase as prior warning increases; or with advanced warning, more 
people choose to evacuate, so the individuals remaining are the ones 
experiencing the Dunning-Kruger effect. Additional research into this discovery is 
necessary to confirm this researches findings. 
Another interesting outcome from the research was that respondents who 
self-identified as an authority also displayed indicators exhibiting Dunning-Kruger 
influences. What is not fully understood is if there is a correlation between 
individuals that self-identify as an authority and decision making influenced by the 
Dunning-Kruger theory. Further research is recommended; specifically, a 
prospective, quantitative research design focusing on policy decision makers 
measured against Dunning-Kruger effects. Establishing how the Dunning-Kruger 
cognitive bias influences individuals facing disasters will benefit homeland 
security professionals and benefit the planning, response, and recovery efforts to 
disasters. 
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There are moments that define a person’s whole life. Moments in 
which everything they are and everything they may possibly 
become hinge on a single decision.  
―Jonathan Mayberry 
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
Decision making is a cognitive process of selecting a course of action or 
belief among multiple alternative choices. Each decision results in a sequence of 
activities or behaviors that the decider deems satisfactory, beneficial, or in their 
best interest. 1  However, pressures of time, circumstance, or unappreciated 
confounding factors can create a situation where seemingly rational decision 
making is not realized. 2 Wickedness, mystifying unknowns, ostensibly illogical 
choice, or paralysis can overtake otherwise competent decision-making 
capabilities.3 Retrospective analysis can sometimes reveal decision making to be 
irrational, harmful, or iniquitous in nature.  
The literature reveals many poor decisions are the result of cognitive bias, 
which is a type of error in thinking that affects the judgments and decisions a 
person makes. First introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 
cognitive bias describes supposed flawed patterns of  responses  to judgments or 
1 Robert Duncan Luce, “Rationality in Choice under Certainty and Uncertainty,” in Emerging 
Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research, ed. Sandra L. Schneider and James 
Shanteau (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64–83.  
2 J. Frank Yates, Elizabeth Veinott, and Andrea L. Patalano, “Hard Decisions, Bad Decisions: 
on Decision Quality and Decision Aiding,” in Emerging Perspectives and Decision Research, ed. 
Sandra Schneider and James Shanteau (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1290&context=div3facpubs, 18–21.  
3 As defined by Rittel and Webber, a wicked problem is a social or cultural problem that is 
difficult, if not impossible, to solve for as many as four reasons: incomplete or contradictory 
knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, the large economic burden, and the 
interconnected nature of these problems with other problems. Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. 
Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (1973): 155–169. 
2 
decision making.4 Because of cognitive bias, decisions, choices, and judgments 
are influenced by a person’s experiential understanding of information and can 
become riddled with miscalculations.5  
A cognitive bias known as the Dunning-Kruger (DK) effect is when “people 
who lack the knowledge or wisdom to perform well are often unaware of this 
fact.”6 Kruger and Dunning attribute this lack of awareness to a metacognitive 
skill deficit, which is “the same incompetence that leads them to make wrong 
choices also deprives them of the savvy necessary to recognize competence, be 
it their own or anyone else’s.”7  
This effect has been demonstrated by experiment in several ways.8 The 
initial Dunning and Kruger research tested students on criteria including humor, 
syntax, and logic, and then compared each student’s self-assessment with the 
actual test results of his or her performance. This revealed that those who scored 
lowest on the test were also found to have “grossly overestimated” their scores.9 
This phenomenon became known as the Dunning-Kruger effect. Furthermore, 
                                            
4 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases,” in Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making, ed. Dirk Wendt, and Charles Vlek 
(New York: Springer, 1975), 141–162, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-1834-
0_8.  
5 Kendra Cherry, “How Cognitive Biases Influence How We Think and Act,” Verywell, 
February 5, 2016, https://www.verywell.com/what-is-a-cognitive-bias-2794963.   
6 Justin Kruger and David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in 
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 77, no. 6 (1999): 1123–1124, doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.77.6.1121.  
7 Ibid., 1125–1126.  
8 David Dunning, “The Dunning-Kruger Effect,” in Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, vol. 44, ed. James M. Olson and Mark P Zanna (Cambridge, MA: Elsevier, 2011), 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/B9780123855220000056, 282.   
9 Kathryn Schulz, Being Wrong: Adventures in the Margin of Error, 1st ed (New York: Ecco, 
2010).  
3 
that research revealed the paradoxical inverse, which also applied: competent 
people tend to underestimate their ability compared to others.10 
The Dunning-Kruger effect is similar to a related, but slightly less specific 
bias, illusory superiority. Illusory superiority is a self-favoring disorder wherein a 
person overestimates her or his positive attributes in comparison to others, while 
simultaneously underestimating his or her negative attributes. 11 However, an 
important difference between illusory superiority and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
occurs when the overconfidence is due to a lack of metacognition of the 
individual. According to Dunning and Kruger, “The miscalibration of the 
incompetent stems from an error about the self.”12 That is, the individuals with 
lesser knowledge are less aware of their inadequacy and therefore cannot 
accurately gauge or assess their incompetence. Simply stated, they do not know 
they do not know, and therefore they believe they possess sufficient skills, 
awareness, or knowledge necessary to deal with the situation.  
Dunning and Kruger first reported individuals frequently overvalue their 
competence. The research has been replicated in subsequent studies by multiple 
authors and suggests everyone suffers to a degree from the Dunning-Kruger 
effect.13 In an interview with Errol Morris, Dr. David Dunning alluded to an ironic 
paradox of the Dunning-Kruger effect when he stated, “the skills you need to 
produce a right answer are exactly the skills you need to recognize what a right 
                                            
10 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1121–1134. 
11 Vera Hoorens, “Self-favoring Biases, Self-Presentation, and the Self-Other Asymmetry in 
Social Comparison,” Journal of Personality 63, no. 4 (1995): 796, doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1995.tb00317.x.   
12 Dunning, “The Dunning-Kruger Effect,” 258.  
13 Studies by Dunning, Heath and Suls (2004), Dunnng (2005), Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, 
Dunning and Kruger (2008), and Cole (unpublished manuscript) purport that even very smart 
people are not immune from the Dunning-Kruger effect. Just because one is intelligent at one 
specialty does not mean one is an expert in other domains.  
4 
answer is.”14 Incompetence denies individuals the ability to recognize that they 
are making poor decisions. An added burden of the Dunning-Kruger effect is that 
the individuals experiencing it believe they have the requisite skills to make a 
rational choice. Therefore, these individuals not only make unrecognized poor 
decisions, they also suffer an overconfidence of ability when reaching their 
erroneous conclusions, a form of illusory superiority.15 The classic example of 
this is exemplified by the actions of McArthur Wheeler:  
McArthur Wheeler, a man who robbed two banks after covering his 
face with lemon juice in the mistaken belief that, because lemon 
juice is usable as invisible ink, it would also prevent his face from 
being recorded by surveillance cameras.16  
According to Kruger and Dunning, Mr. Wheeler was incompetent when it 
came to understanding how lemon juice works and thus could not comprehend 
why his face would be visible on a surveillance camera.17 The case of McArther 
Wheeler inspired Dr. Dunning and his graduate student, Justin Kruger, to 
research and develop what is now understood as the Dunning-Kruger effect. 
Another example comes from a Hurricane Katrina experience. Flooding 
resulting from heavy rains and storm surge are commonly associated with 
hurricanes. As Katrina approached, administrators of a New Orleans hospital, 
Pendleton Methodist, were offered assistance to evacuate the hospital’s in-
patient population before Katrina made landfall; however, they decided against 
evacuation.18 After the hurricane, the hospital was sued because of its disaster 
                                            
14 Errol Morris, “The Anosognosic’s Dilemma: Something’s Wrong but You’ll Never Know 
What It Is (Part 1),” New York Times Opinionator [blog], June 20, 2010, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/the-anosognosics-dilemma-1/.  
15 Jeffrey Way, “Do You Suffer from the Dunning-Kruger Effect?,” envatotuts+, October 12, 
2011, http://code.tutsplus.com/articles/do-you-suffer-from-the-dunning-kruger-effect--net-22227.  
16 Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris, “Why Losers Have Delusions of Grandeur,” New 
York Post, May 23, 2010, http://nypost.com/2010/05/23/why-losers-have-delusions-of-grandeur/.  
17 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1121–1134.  
18 Lacoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hospital (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2007).  
5 
planning, or lack thereof. According to the suit, the hospital was accused of being 
negligent in the death of a patient and for not properly preparing for hurricane 
situations.19 The suit accused the hospital leadership of poor decision making 
leading up to Hurricane Katrina, which included the decision not to evacuate the 
facility and for locating the emergency power generators in the basement, an 
area known to have flooded in previous storms. When the hospital administrator 
was questioned about the generator he stated under oath, “I didn’t know it would 
fail.” 20  The attorney for the plaintiff provided experts who testified that the 
hospitals’ emergency power system design was critically flawed in that it was 
located in an area that should have been known for flooding. One explained, “It 
was an obvious defect that could have been solved for a very little sum of 
money.”21 Also according to testimony, relocating the power generator to the roof 
of the hospital would have all but eliminated any chance of its being affected by 
flooding.22  
Furthermore, the hospital disaster planners were unaware that emergency 
power generators would not operate if inundated by water. The administrators 
were skilled in hospital operations; however, though they were unaware of it, they 
lacked the knowledge necessary to properly plan for and safeguard their 
hospital’s in-patient population. This lack of skill and awareness created a 
situation in which hospital administrators become overly confident in their ability 
19 Ibid. 
20 “New Orleans Hospital Settles Post-Katrina Wrongful Death Lawsuit,” Insurance Journal 
[online], January 28, 2010, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
southcentral/2010/01/28/106964.htm.  
21 Alejandro de los Rios, “Hospital CEO Pounded over Generators Used during Katrina in 
Wrongful Death Trial,” Louisiana Record, May 11, 2010, http://louisianarecord.com/ 
stories/510580038-hospital-ceo-pounded-over-generators-used-during-katrina-in-wrongful-death-
trial.  
22 de los Rios, “Hospital CEO Pounded;” Robert Hamilton, Lessons in Emergency Power 




to respond to anticipated disasters, and their overconfidence in the hospital 
infrastructure created a situation wherein at least one individual died.   
Disasters are known for being multi-dimensionally chaotic, disjointed, and 
having uncoordinated or unreliable information streams on which people base 
decisions. 23  Combine this with a cognitive bias wherein individuals lack the 
necessary knowledge or skills to safely address the threat and the metacognitive 
proficiencies to realize they are lacking necessary skills, and it creates an 
opportunity for the individuals to be overly confident in their abilities to positively 
address threats. Competent disaster decision making becomes especially 
important because personal choice not only affects the individual, but may also 
impact others, including those tasked with responding to immediate life safety 
concerns. 
Surprisingly, there is very little research surrounding the Dunning-Kruger 
effect on individuals facing choices during disasters; however, a better 
understanding of this effect may explain why in disasters some people make 
seemingly irrational choices—choices that sometimes result in unwarranted 
injury or death. Determining if Dunning-Kruger indicators manifest in survivors 
from disasters is a logical first step to addressing the wicked problem of how 
individuals make less than optimal decisions when confronted with perceived or 
realized disaster threats.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the question, "Are there indicators of 
Dunning-Kruger effects in individuals who encountered natural or human caused 
disasters?"  
23 Ming-Chou Ho et al., “How Do Disaster Characteristics Influence Risk Perception?,” Risk 
Analysis 28, no. 3 (June 2008): 635–643, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01040.x.   
7 
C. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
This thesis applies the work of Dr. David Dunning and Justin Kruger. 
Previous and related studies have identified the presence of Dunning-Kruger 
(DK) effects in other domains such as academics, medicine, and finance. 
However, to date, no scholarly study has examined if the Dunning-Kruger theory 
applies in the dominion of individuals confronting natural and manmade 
disasters. 
Furthermore, since the Dunning-Kruger theory is relatively new (first 
introduced in 1999), there is a lack of study on its application to the individual 
making decisions in the context of perceived or realized disaster peril. The 
subjects of this research are individuals that have experienced and survived a 
recent natural disaster or terrorist event. Focus for this research centered on the 
Dunning-Kruger effect and its relationship to individual decision making relating 
to disaster threats. 
According to Auf der Heide, “Disaster planning is only as good as the 
assumptions on which it is based.”24 This thesis adds to the existing body of 
knowledge by determining if Dunning-Kruger indicators are present in the 
accounts of survivors of a natural (Hurricane Katrina) and human caused disaster 
(9/11) in the United States. To date, no academic research has examined the 
relationship of the Dunning-Kruger theory with homeland security threats. 
Moreover, research of the Dunning-Kruger cognitive bias associated with 
individuals facing significant threat might improve disaster planning and aid in 
combating the wickedness associated with realized significant perils.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, including this chapter, which 
defines the problem space and purpose of the thesis. It describes the research 
24 Erik Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning,” Annals of 
Emergency Medicine 47, no. 1 (2006): 34–49, doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2005.05.009.  
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question and explains the significance of the research. Finally, this chapter 
identifies the thesis structure and provides an overview of what the reader may 
expect, including output benchmarks. 
Chapter II focuses on existing literature related to disaster decision 
making, human behavior, and choice. Specific concepts and theories are 
introduced and expounded upon to provide a foundational discussion of free will, 
choice, and metacognition. In addition, it explores barriers and boundaries that 
create resistance to seemingly rational decision making. Finally, it introduces 
chaos associated with disasters and concludes by connecting human behavior to 
decisions influenced by the Dunning-Kruger effect.  
Chapter III provides information on the research question and design. 
additionally, the chapter outlines the Dunning-Kruger theory and its basic 
components. Next, it explains justification of methodology, data collection 
sampling procedures, and the data analysis process. Lastly, assumptions, 
limitations, and bias are defined in this chapter. 
Chapter IV is a meta-analysis case study of hurricane Katrina as an 
exemplar of a natural disaster. Using transcripts from previous interviews of 
Hurricane Katrina survivors, it introduces 12 indicators to evaluate the presence 
of Dunning-Kruger characteristics in the survivors. The indicators are explained 
in the appendix and form the basis to evaluate presence or absence of the 
Dunning-Kruger effect. Finally, it analyzes data obtained from the research and 
includes a discussion of the findings. 
Chapter V continues the meta-analysis case study, but this time for a 
human caused disaster. The chapter focuses on attacks of the World Trade 
Center by using transcripts from interviews of World Trade Center survivors. An 
analysis and discussion of the World Trade Center data then follows. 
Chapter VI applies the literature findings of Chapter III with the results in 
Chapters IV and V. This chapter also examines Dunning-Kruger influences that 
decision makers should consider when planning for disaster threats. This portion 
9 
of the thesis attempts to bridge the decision-making capabilities of those placed 
under life-threatening strain with policy strategies to achieve positive outcomes. 
Finally, this chapter provides a summary of the research findings, suggests future 
research opportunities, and identifies limitations discovered during research. 
10 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
We’re not very good at knowing what we don’t know. 
―David Dunning 
This literature review begins by defining threat, and more importantly, 
what threat-induced decisions look like to the U.S. homeland security community. 
This chapter also explores theories related to disaster decision making and 
choices. Next, is an evaluation of concepts associated with the Dunning-Kruger 
theory in the context of disaster decision making. Finally, strategies to minimize 
the negative effects of cognitive bias are explored. 
A. THREAT 
The concept of threat can be defined many ways. Overall, threat is an 
expression of potential to harm or place in peril an individual or thing. The Oxford 
Dictionary defines threat as “A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, 
damage, or other hostile action on someone in retribution for something done or 
not done; the possibility of trouble, danger or disaster.” 25  Merriam-Webster 
defines threat as “the possibility that something bad or harmful could happen.”26 
By these definitions, there are many threats an individual confronts any typical 
day. For instance, on a personal level, there is the threat of falling, the threat of 
fire, the threat of having an acute medical event, the threat of being attacked, and 
even the threat of being struck. Similarly, the United States, as a nation, faces 
threats. Examples of national threats include economic devaluation of the dollar, 
25 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, s.v. “Threat,” accessed September 19, 2015, 
http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/threat?q=threat.  
26 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. “Threat,” accessed November 4, 2015, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/threat. 
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catastrophic large area natural disasters and fires, pandemic calamities, terrorist 
attacks, and cyber assaults.27  
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper remarks, “Today, threats 
are more diverse, interconnected, and viral than at any time in history.”28 Local 
events that might seem irrelevant can affect U.S. national security in accelerated 
units of time.29 Clearly, there are more potential threats than an individual—or 
nation—can identify, analyze, address, and mitigate. Subsequently, choices are 
made to allocate limited resources. During testimony to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Clapper testified, “…if left unaddressed, some threats 
have minimal effects while other threats if left unchecked, may have monumental 
detrimental consequences.” 30  Some threats are easy to identify, analyze, or 
mitigate while others become complex with multifaceted factors that make the 
threat difficult to recognize or address.31  
B. DISASTER DECISION-MAKING CONCEPTS 
Disasters represent high risk, low occurrence events for the average 
person and are often a perceived threat that becomes realized. Research is 
ongoing, but it is important to understand that others have studied disaster 
decision making. This thesis builds upon what is understood to be significant 
works in choice. Individuals, such as Amos Tversky and Daniel Khaneman, have 
27 Office of the President of the United States, 2015 National Security Strategy (Washington, 
DC: Office of the President of the United States, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, 2. 
28 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Covering the Period 
January 5, 2011, to January 3, 2013, United States Senate, 113th Cong., 1 (2013) (statement of 
James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence).  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 4. 
31 Ibid., 65. 
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developed taxonomies for framing decisions or managing risks of uncertainty.32 
L. Douglas Kiel incorporated the instability of chaos with disaster decision 
making, and Gary Klein has studied the fire service to understand how critical 
decision making under the real-life constraints of time and tremendous loss (life) 
are made.33 Understanding threat-based decision making continues with recent 
work completed at the Naval Postgraduate School by Robert Mahoney. Mahoney 
asserts that each research study builds a dataset from which society can gain a 
better understanding of how threat-induced decisions are made by the individual 
and as a collective group.34 
In its most basic form, decision making is the act of choosing between 
multiple alternatives. In addition, decisions are derived from knowledge in a 
particular area. Using this knowledge, decisions are constructed from the internal 
preferences and external inputs contributing to compose a set of choice options. 
It is a reasonable assumption that rational individuals will utilize the information 
available, along with their social construct of reality, to decide among existing 
options the most beneficial alternative.35 
People also make decisions to solve problems. Sometimes the issue at 
hand can be simple and relatively inconsequential; other times, the choice can 
bring with it importance of great significance. Furby and Beyth-Marom have 
identified a five-step, normative model of decision making: 
32 Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainty 
Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809477.  
33 Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, 7th ed. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT, 2001).  
34 Robert T. Mahoney, “Deciding Who Lives: Considered Risk Casualty Decisions in 
Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/3737.  
35 Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions (New York: Basic Books, 1996). 
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1. Identify the possible options, 
2. Identify the possible consequences that may follow each option, 
3. Evaluate the desirability of each of the consequences,  
4. Assess the likelihood of each consequence, 
5. Make a choice.36 
A critical analysis of the Furby and Beyth-Marom framework suggests this 
is an imperfect model because individuals will not always have all the 
information, the information may not be correct and timely, or there may be other 
constraints impeding optimal choice options.  
1. Chaos Theory  
Chaos is the science of the nonlinear, the unpredictable, and the infinitely 
complex. By studying the interconnectedness of complex, chaotic dynamics often 
associated with disaster situations, one can attempt to escape potentially 
damaging actions that may be detrimental.37 Often, a threat is time constrained 
such that an individual must perceive, identify, and make decisions in a short 
period with incomplete or inaccurate information.38 The concept that threat may 
be misinterpreted to scope, scale, and impact is well demonstrated through 
adaptations of chaos theory. 39  Chaos theory, which dates back to 1880, 
addresses “nonlinear things that are effectively impossible to predict or control 
                                            
36 Ruth Beyth-Marom et al., “Perceived Consequences of Risky Behaviors: Adults and 
Adolescents.,” Developmental Psychology 29, no. 3 (1993): 549–563, doi:10.1037/0012-
1649.29.3.549.    
37 “What Is Chaos Theory?,” Fractal Foundation, accessed July 7, 2016, 
http://fractalfoundation.org/resources/what-is-chaos-theory/.  
38 Mahoney, “Deciding Who Lives.”  
39 L. Douglas Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management: Lessons for 
Managing Periods of Extreme Instability,” in What Disaster Response Management Can Learn 
from Chaos Theory, ed. Gus Koehler, (California Research Bureau Sacramento, CA, 1995), 
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/96/05/over_12.html.  
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(like turbulence, weather or the stock market), and often is described by fractal 
mathematics.”40 Principals of chaos theory include: 
• The butterfly effect (how a butterfly flapping its wings may influence
weather patterns on the other side of the world),
• Unpredictability (not knowing and accounting for all of the
influencing conditions render accurate predictions impossible),
• Transitions between order and disorder with feedback (one factor
influences another factor, which in turn, influences the original
factor),
• Fractals (“infinitely complex patterns that are self-similar across
different scales”).41
Disasters, like chaos, are influenced by nonlinear events and therefore 
susceptible to increased levels of unpredictability and uncertainty, which in turn 
can influence outcomes.42 Koehler further expands on the similarities of chaos 
theory to homeland security threats by connecting nonlinear events and 
homeland security threats as those situations that are unpredictable and can 
occur at any time, unfold in geographic space and time with unknown 
boundaries, with illicit information that is incomplete or inaccurate, and tax 
resources available to address the threat.43 As Koehler explains, “Disaster and 
emergency situations epitomize the nonlinearity of human events.” 44  This 
heuristic is supported by Drabek’s assentation that disasters represent 
40 Henri Poincaré first developed chaos theory in the 1880s while studying the three-body 
problem. Later, in 1898, Jacques Hadamard advanced the concept of chaotic motion and then in 
1961 Edward Lorenze employed chaos theory to explain weather patterns and predictions. 
Today, chaos theory continues to evolve and be redefined with a growing body of research 
beyond weather patterns. Adapted from, “What Is Chaos Theory?,” Fractal Foundation,” 
accessed July 7, 2016, http://fractalfoundation.org/resources/what-is-chaos-theory/.  
41 “What Is Chaos Theory?,” Fractal Foundation. 




complexity and instability consistent with chaos, and he also asserts it is 
important to establish order from the disorder associated with disasters.45 
2. Rational Choice  
Humans desire to create order from disorder; however, chaotic “events 
often seem to churn one step ahead of best efforts.”46 Rational choice theory is a 
framework for modeling and understanding how individuals’ decisions are based 
on their ability to maximize their own benefit(s).47 Through individuals’ socially 
constructed reality, the rational choice can be predicted across an aggregate 
pattern of others choices, such that the act of decision making is consistent in 
choosing the self-determined best choice of action.48  
Critics of rational choice theory say the model makes assumptions that 
may be unrealistic because often people have an imperfect data set of relevant 
information. In addition, there may be an oversimplification of influencers that 
leads the decision maker to be constrained to make incomplete or irrational 
choices. Another criticism of the rational choice theory is that it “denies the 
existence of any kind of action other than what is considered the purely rational 
choice.”49  
                                            
45 Thomas E. Drabek, “Predicting Disaster Response Effectiveness,” International Journal of 
Mass Emergencies and Disasters 23, no. 1 (2005): 49–72, 
http://www.ijmed.org/articles/540/download/.  
46 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Response Management,” 186.  
47 Rational choice theory is also known as choice theory and rational action theory. It was 
well described and studied by Amos Tversky and David Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions,” The Journal of Business 59, no. 4 (1996): S251–S278.  
48 Tversky and Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions;” Peter L Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (New York: Open Road Integrated Media, 1966).  
49 Gary K. Browning, Abigail Halcli, and Frank Webster, eds., Understanding Contemporary 
Society: Theories of the Present (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000), 126–127, 136. 
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3. Bounded Rationality
Bounded rationality builds on the common criticisms of rational choice 
theory and postulates, “when individuals make decisions, their rationality is 
limited by the information they have.” 50  This cognitive restriction is further 
affected by factors such as time available to make a decision and any prior skills 
and experiences, or lack thereof, individuals have relative to the decision to be 
made.51 Herbert A. Simon proposed the concept of bounded rationality based on 
these considerations. 52  Additionally, research by Fauconnier and Turner 
indicates that individuals can experience increased bounded rationality from a 
cognitive “tunnel vision” resulting from information overload. 53  A hallmark of 
disaster decision making includes an excess of informational inputs, some 
germane, some irrelevant to reaching a seemingly rational choice. 
Kiel’s description of chaos theory introduces nonlinear inputs that are 
impossible to predict or control during disasters.54 In addition, Fauconnier and 
Turner posit that humans are poor deductive logic thinkers but better at pattern 
recognition when faced with a threat.55 This banding of chaos, rational choice, 
and bounded reality, coupled with the findings of Fauconnier and Turners, greatly 
confines human decision making. It also explains why people facing significant 
threats might make poor decisions.  
50 Herbert A. Simon, “Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning,” Organization 
Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 126, doi:10.1287/orsc.2.1.125.   
51 James March, Herbert Simon, and Harold Guetzkow, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 
1958), 157–159.    
52 Ibid. 
53 Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the 
Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 1.  
54 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Management.” 
55 Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 249. 
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Numerous theories and models of threat decision making have contributed 
to developing human response taxonomies to threat. 56  From them, patterns 
emerge, and three basic themes congruent with the basic tenants of the 
Dunning-Kruger theory materialize from synthesis of these studies:  
1. Individuals are often ill prepared to respond to new, nonlinear, and 
multifaceted threat scaled at the possibility of death or severe 
impairment.57 Congruent with being “unskilled” in the Dunning-
Kruger domain. 
2. “People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities” to 
effectively respond to threats—a form of illusion superiority.58  
3. Multiple option choices create complexity such that decision 
paralysis and decreased satisfaction results from making “hard 
choices.”59 Represented by Dunning and Kruger as being 
“unaware” since the individuals lack the skills necessary to 
recognize what abilities are required to effectively respond to the 
presented threat.60 
4. Immeasurability of Choice  
According to Ruth Chang, identifying and quantifying factors influencing 
human decision making remains a challenge.61 Performance and predictability 
decision making in the face of threat (time-constrained, high impact, and 
nonlinear or chaotic) remain elusive, and often failure can be traced back to 
                                            
56 Keith Punch, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 
2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), 13–33.  
57 Gus Koehler, What Disaster Response Management Can Learn from Chaos Theory 
(Sacramento, CA: California Research Bureau, 1995); Kaylene Williams, “Fear Appeal Theory,” 
Research in Business and Economics Journal 5, no. 1 (2012): 1–21, 
http://m.www.aabri.com/manuscripts/11907.pdf.  
58 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1121.  
59 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, 1st ed. 
(New York: Harper, 2008); Christopher L. Dancy et al., “Using a Cognitive Architecture with a 
Physiological Substrate to Represent Effects of a Psychological Stressor on Cognition,” 
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 21, no. 1 (2015): 90–114; Sheena 
Lyengar, The Art of Choosing, 1st ed. (New York: Twelve, 2010); Ruth Chang, “Are Hard Choices 
Cases of Incomparability?,” Philosophical Issues 22, no. 1 (2012): 108–113.  
60 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1121.  
61 Chang, “Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?”  
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human factors.62 Rarely do humans behave optimally.63 Consequently, rarely do 
predicted results of rational choice—or for that matter, bounded rationality—
replicate in actual disasters.64  
The chaos concept indicates that any multitude of inputs can influence 
results, and even the seemingly smallest and inconsequential variable can alter 
outcomes. Moreover, every disaster has seemingly infinite factors influencing 
how it will present itself. Equally impressive are the influencers introduced by 
human response. Combined, the opportunity for choice becomes neither rational 
nor bounded because of the immeasurable possibilities that may influence 
human decisions.  
5. Cognitive and Decision Illusion
Behaviorist Dan Ariely has developed the idea that we, as humans, do not 
know our own preferences and therefore make irrational decisions. In his studies, 
Dr. Ariely advances the concepts of “cognitive illusion,” which leads to “decision 
illusion.” 65  Since humans do not understand their own cognitive limitations, 
decision making becomes flawed and irrational (cognitive illusion). 66  This 
cognitive illusion falsely supports a sense of capability. It is not because humans 
do not care about the consequences; rather, it is because the threat analysis is 
complex and presents in a nonlinear, multifaceted environment that irrationality 
develops.67 As described by Kiel in 2015, complexity creates chaos, which, in 
62 Jean Carlson et al., “Measuring and Modeling Behavioral Decision Dynamics in Collective 
Evacuation,” PLoS ONE 9, no. 2 (2014), doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0087380,  
12, 14, 42–45.  
63 Ibid., 42–45.  
64 Dancy et al., “Using a Cognitive Architecture.” 
65 Dan Ariely, “Are We in Control of Our Own Decisions?” Ted Talks, video, December 2008, 
http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_ariely_asks_are_we_in_control_of_our_own_decisions, Ted Talk 
video recording, 17:26.  
66 Fauconnier and Turner, On Identifying Human Capital, 1–10. 
67 Ibid., abstract. 
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turn, creates more complexity. 68  Added complexity generates opportunity for 
irrational decision making (decision illusion), and Dr. Ariely posits the idea that 
cognitive limitations are much more difficult to recognize than physical limitations 
and subsequently are much more difficult to manage.69 
6. Disaster Decision-Making Frameworks  
The concept of disaster decision making can be separated into two main 
themes, pre-event and event.70 Decisions arrived at before a disaster allow the 
prospect to generally increase opportunity for rational choice and control for 
some restraints, such as time, available resources or other factors that may 
bound an individual or group in their decision making. 71  Decision-making 
illustrations abound for both the government and individuals. For example, in an 
area such as New Orleans, known for flooding and wind damage from 
hurricanes, the government has developed pre-disaster strategies to mitigate, 
protect, respond, and recover from the threat of natural storms. 72  Likewise, 
individuals living in the area can have developed plans to safeguard their 
property and family members, including predetermined triggers for when to 
implement such planning.73 
                                            
68 Kiel, “Chaos Theory and Disaster Management.”  
69 Ariely, Predictably Irrational, 1.  
70 Benjamin Wisner, ed., At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters, 
2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 5. 
71 Adam Cartier et al., “Disaster Decision Making: Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav in New 
Orleans” (paper, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 2009), http://m.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-
project/Available/E-project-031609-172505/unrestricted/IQPReportFINAL.pdf.   
72 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, National Response Framework: FEMA Needs 
Policies and Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process 
(GAO-08-768) (Washington, DC: U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, 2008), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/276372.pdf.  
73 National Weather Service, “Hurricane Preparedness Week, May 15–21, 2016,” accessed 
July 8, 2016, http://www.nws.noaa.gov/com/weatherreadynation/hurricane_preparedness.html. 
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C. DUNNING-KRUGER THEORY AND APPLIED WORK 
1. Dunning-Kruger
The Dunning-Kruger theory advances the idea that individuals who lack 
the cognitive skills to accurately identify or assess threats are also deprived the 
metacognitive reasoning capability to recognize their shortcomings.74 Essentially, 
people do not know they do not know and therefore have an inflated—and often 
irrational—capability perception. In the context of realized threat, what they 
perceive as a simple choice is actually a complex, nonlinear decision evolving in 
a chaotically unpredictable environment. Subsequently, what an individual 
perceives as a simple threat decision rapidly becomes a hard choice. 75 
According to author Tal Yarkoni, “It’s important to note that Dunning and Kruger 
never claimed to show that the unskilled think they’re better than the skilled; 
that’s just the way the finding is often interpreted by others.”76 Their findings 
simply state that the unskilled have an inflated perception of capability that is 
unwarranted.77 However, additional studies by Ehrlinger et al. reveal that the 
incompetence of those lacking skill produces a double curse. First, individuals’ 
incompetence denies them the ability to produce correct responses, and 
therefore they make many mistakes. Second, this very same incompetence 
furthermore deprives the individuals of successful metacognitive task recognition 
regarding whether a particular decision is a correct or an incorrect choice.78  
74 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1121–1134. 
75 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It;” Ariely, “Are We in Control of Our Own 
Decisions;” Ruth Chang, “How to Make Hard Choices,” May 2014, 
http://www.ted.com/talks/ruth_chang_how_to_make_hard_choices.  
76 Tal Yarkoni, “What the Dunning-Kruger Effect Is and Isn’t,” Tal Yarkoni [blog], July 7, 
2010, http://www.talyarkoni.org/blog/2010/07/07/what-the-dunning-kruger-effect-is-and-isnt/. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” abstract; Joyce Ehrlinger et al., “Why 
the Unskilled Are Unaware: Further Explorations of (Absent) Self-Insight among the 
Incompetent,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 105, no. 1 (2008): 98–
121, doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.05.002.  
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2. Threat Convergence
James J. F. Forest published multiple papers outlining the effects of 
decision making as it relates to the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
terrorism. 79  In his studies, Forest found that as complexity increases, the 
probability of successful threat analysis and response decreases.80 Additional 
studies by J. F. Forest then apply the Dunning-Kruger cognitive bias to illustrate 
as complexity increases, the opportunity of the unskilled overestimation of ability 
also increases and suggests human decision making can be substituted with 
artificial intelligence.81  
3. Fear Appeal
Kaylene C. Williams’s theory of fear appeal hypothesizes the risk of 
deciding to not act to a threat may create dire consequences for an individual or 
group. That is, fear appeal is predicated on a threat to a person’s wellbeing so 
much that it motivates him or her toward action.82 Williams’s fear appeal relies 
upon rational choice theory as its foundational belief that a person should act 
based on what provides the individual greatest benefit.  
However, what happens when the individuals lack the skills necessary to 
achieve rational choice? The Dunning-Kruger effect further complicates the 
situation because the unskilled are also unaware. That is, individuals lack 
requisite skill and awareness, which bounds rational choices and creates 
79 James Forest, “Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism,” Journal of 
Strategic Security 5, no. 4 (2012): 51–68, doi: 10.5038/1944-0472.5.4.4.  
80 Ibid., 55. 
81 James J. F. Forest and Russell D. Howard, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2013).  
82 Williams, Fear Appeal Theory, 1–21; Herbert A. Simon, “Bounded Rationality and 
Organizational Learning,” Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 125–134, 
doi:10.1287/orsc.2.1.125.  
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opportunity for the choices to be detrimental.83 According to Williams, Dunning, 
and Kruger, “Incompetent performers display little insight into just how poorly 
they perform.”84 In these instances, “fear is more powerful than reason.”85 This 
position is further supported with Stephen Maren’s work advancing the idea that 
fear creates an autonomic reaction that can be irrational and not subject to 
reason.86  
In a similar study, Kim and Crowston advanced the evaluation of decision 
making; what they discovered was important in understanding basic human 
decision development. 87  According to Kim and Crowston, humans develop 
patterns of learned behavior that they can then apply to situations that, while new 
and different to the individual(s), are similar to past experiences. Kim and 
Crowston present an analogy of people looking into their Rolodex® of past 
experiences to respond to a new challenge, but with similarities to prior 
encounters.88 This is analogous to Gary Klein’s assertion that decision making 
becomes naturalistic from prior involvement to threat.89Concerns of bolstering 
83 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1–10; Williams, “Fear Appeal Theory,” 
2. 
84 Elanor F. Williams, David Dunning, and Justin Kruger, “The Hobgoblin of Consistency: 
Algorithmic Judgment Strategies Underlie Inflated Self-Assessments of Performance,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 104, no. 6 (2013): 976–994, doi:10.1037/a0032416.  
85 Williams, “Fear Appeal Theory,” 977; Sharon Begley et al., “The Roots of Fear,” 
Newsweek 150, no. 26 (2007): 36.   
86 In “The Roots of Fear,” Begley et al. theorize that fear is a dominant evolutionary primacy 
trait that overrides the brain’s higher functions of reason. Advances the idea that fear is much like 
an autonomic reaction that is irrational and not subject to reason—a higher function of the human 
brain. Stephen Maren, “Pavlovian Fear Conditioning as a Behavioral Assay for Hippocampus and 
Amygdala Function: Cautions and Caveats,” European Journal of Neuroscience 28, no. 8 (2008): 
1661–1666, doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2008.06485.x.  
87 Youngseek Kim and Kevin Crowston, “Technology Adoption and Use Theory Review for 
Studying Scientists’ Continued Use of Cyber-Infrastructure,” Proceedings of the American Society 
for Information Science and Technology 48, no. 1 (2011): 1–10, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/meet.2011.14504801197/full.  
88 Kim and Crowston, “Technology Adoption,” 8. 
89 Gary A. Klein, A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision Making 
(New York: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993), 143–144.  
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poor decision making arise when, despite a lack of skill, positive outcome is 
achieved thereby naturalizing bad choice.90  
Individuals experiencing Dunning-Kruger effects may bolster their 
overconfidence simply because they did not experience negative consequences 
from the previous situation. Dr. David Dunning advances a similar hypothesis in 
some of his publications addressing flawed decision making.91 He observes, “A 
person undergoing Dunning-Kruger effects may create an overconfidence simply 
because they did not experience negative consequences from the previous 
situation.”92 
4. Social Cognitive
To support their findings, Dunning and Kruger present social cognitive 
theory (SCT) as substantiation. According to Bandura, the author of SCT, “what 
people think, believe, and feel affects how they behave.”93 Dunning and Kruger 
refer to Bandura’s 1977 work to explain how people “acquire and maintain certain 
behavioral patterns based on the learning from others.”94 Additional information 
from Youngseek and Crowston suggests that both outcome expectations and 
self-efficacy can influence behavior. 95  Outcome expectations and the self-
90 Vicky Arnold et al., “The Effect of Experience and Complexity on Order and Recency Bias 
in Decision Making by Professional Accountants,” Accounting and Finance 40, no. 2 (July 2000): 
109–134, doi:10.1111/1467-629X.00039.  
91 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1–10; David Dunning, “On Identifying 
Human Capital: Flawed Knowledge Leads to Faulty Judgments of Expertise by Individuals and 
Groups,” in On Identifying Human Capital, vol. 32, ed. Edward J. Lawler and Shane R Thye 
(Emerald Group Publishing Limited Bradford, 2015): 149–176, 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/S0882-614520150000032006.  
92 Dunning, “The Dunning-Kruger Effect,” 260. 
93 Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 25. 
94 Kim, and Crowston, “Technology Adoption,” 1–10; Albert Bandura, Social Learning 
Theory, Prentice-Hall Series in Social Learning Theory (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1977). 
95 Kim and Crowston, “Technology Adoption,” 4–5. 
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perceived ability to complete a task are in turn influenced by individuals’ prior 
behavior.96 If this is true, then the unskilled and unaware modeling, as described 
by Dunning and Kruger, can also propagate inappropriate skills and behavior in 
others who are also unaware that the learned skills are unfitting for the situation 
or task. This ignorance can create a false sense of overconfidence in a group.  
A study published in the American Journal of Public Health also supports 
the findings of Youngseek and Crowston wherein the authors identify that when 
communicating threats to the public, the message matters. As Wray et al. 
explain, “First, messages should emphasize simple, practical steps and basic 
information about the threat.”97 Also according to Wray et al., “Messages should 
be simple enough for people to understand under high-stress conditions.”98 This 
approach is in harmony with Dr. Ariely’s instructions on how to minimize decision 
illusion and facilitate rational choice while attempting to control chaos theories 
nonlinear, butterfly effects associated with disasters. 99 The second finding to 
come out of the work of Wray et al. is that the message must be disseminated 
quickly because one of the first actions taken by individuals challenged with 
threat is that of personal protection. 100  This assignment is congruent with 
Williams fear-appeal work and fits well with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
theory.101  
96 Ibid., 6. 
97 Ricardo J. Wray et al., “Communicating with the Public about Emerging Health Threats: 
Lessons from the Pre-event Message Development Project,” American Journal of Public Health 
98, no. 12 (December 2008): 2214–2222.  
98 Ibid., 2220. 
99 This is the author’s synthesis of chaos theory, rational choice theory, decision illusion, and 
Fauconnier and Turner’s work.  
100 Wray et al., “Communicating with the Public,” 2220. 
101 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a well-accepted theory proposed by Abraham Maslow in 
his 1943 paper “A Theory of Human Motivation.” According to Maslow, a person’s physiological 
and safety needs must be achieved before any other needs are met. Abraham H. Maslow, “A 
Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–396, doi: 
10.1037/h0054346.  
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5. Simple and Hard Choices
Dr. Ruth Chang’s analysis helps science further expand the difference 
between simple and hard choices.102 Chang states, “What makes a choice hard 
is the way the alternatives relate…small choices can be hard” and hard choices 
sometimes lead to “the safest” option choice.103 Also according to Chang, values 
do not equate to scientific quantities—that is “ought does not equal is.”104 Rather, 
hard choices have an additional consideration, which Chang coins “on a par.”105 
A hard choice may create options that are on a par with each other for an 
individual, but the choice may not be a rational choice when examined from an 
objective perspective.106 Dr. Chang ties the work of Banduras, Youngseek, and 
Crowston, Dancy et al., Dunning and Kruger, Ariely, and Kiel together in such a 
way to realize why folks make seemingly irrational decisions to perceived or 
actual threats. Dr. Chang’s work also provides an opportunity to understand why 
individuals may experience decreased satisfaction and less engagement when 
making hard choices.107 
The findings of Chang and the other researchers mentioned thus far in this 
literature review lead to the question what strategies can be used to make 
choices easier? Carlson et al. examined this particular question in 2014.108 They 
identified and quantified factors influencing human decision making when facing 
a threat in the setting of a natural disaster. Many poor outcomes they identified 
102 Chang, “Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability,” 106–126. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Chang, “How to Make Hard Choices,” 14:42. 
106 Ibid.   
107 In The Art of Choosing, Lyengar presents the idea that decreased satisfaction arises 
from hard choices. Chang supports the idea in her Ted Talk, “How to Make Hard Choices.”  
108 Carlson et al., “Measuring and Modeling Behavioral.” 
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were traced to human factors.109 In addition, Carlson et al. recognized overload 
and miscommunication attributed to a “temporal urgency associated with the 
imminence of the disaster.” 110  They also discovered that individual decision 
making is influenced by the cohort populations’ groupthink and coined the 
concept of “cascading behavior” to explain how fads (generalized ideas about the 
situation, regardless if based upon fact or not), emerge or fade.111 This study 
supports the assentation of Dunning and Kruger, Chang, Ariely, and Kim and 
Crowston that decision making to threat is not always rational, is often based 
upon fear, and it can be learned behavior from others—even if the learned 
behavior is from the unskilled and not altogether rational. The study also affirmed 
Fauconnier and Turner’s assertion that due to information overload, a cognitive 
tunnel vision is entirely plausible, which, in turn, can contribute to cognitive 
illusion.112 Unfortunately, these individuals also lack the skills necessary to make 
such decisions. More importantly, they are unaware they lack skill, leading to a 
false sense of overconfidence of ability—hallmarks of the Dunning-Kruger 
effects.113 
6. Enhancing Decision Making
Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman also looked at opportunities to enhance 
decision-making abilities and identified three variables: 
109 Ibid., 15.  
110 Ibid., 16.  
111 Ibid., 1.  
112 Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 1–10.  
113  Ehrlinger et al., “Why the Unskilled Are Unaware,” 98–121. 
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1. Decrease surprise,
2. Lengthen decision time, and
3. Have realistically valued goals.114
Surprise can be decreased through intelligence, education, engineering, 
and pre-event planning.115 By reducing surprise, the authors submit that there 
may be less physiological effects that can produce “tunnel vision” associated with 
the fight or flight response of humans.116 Dancy et al. support the interaction 
between cognition and physiology. A longer decision-making time allows the user 
to gather more relevant information and may also facilitate coping proficiencies 
along with rational thought process such that realistically valued goals can be 
formulated.117 Again, the original work of Dunning and Kruger’s appears to show 
agreement in this argument when applied to self-awareness and decision-making 
skills.118 
Thus far, review of the literature has been primarily focused on 
individualistic approaches to understanding decision making in the face of threat. 
What about a larger approach of decision making as it relates to national threat—
that of homeland security? John Mueller claims that the U.S. government policy 
making is based almost entirely on the “contemplation of the consequences of a 
terrorist attack while substantially ignoring the equally important likelihood 
component of risk assessment as well as the key issue of risk reduction.”119 This 
114 Robert S. Billings, Thomas W. Milburn, and Mary Lou Schaalman, “A Model of Crisis 
Perception: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” Administrative Science Quarterly 25, no. 2 
(1980): 300, doi:10.2307/2392456.    
115 Morgan Stanley, Preparing for a Disaster or Catastrophic Event [brochure] (New York: 
Morgan Stanley, 2013), https://www.morganstanley.com/wealth/wealthplanning/pdfs/disaster 
_preparedness_brochure.pdf.  
116 Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman, “A Model of Crisis Perception,” 313. 
117 Ibid., 300. 
118 Ehrlinger et al., “Why the Unskilled Are Unaware,” 98–121. 
119 Mark G. Stewart and John Mueller, “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, no. 1 (2011): 43, 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/43.  
29 
statement indicates a lack of skill and a lack of metacognitive awareness by 
government officials—hallmarks of the Dunning-Kruger effect. 
7. Approaches to Minimize Poor Decision Making
Stephan Marsar’s work on threat decision making focuses on individual 
and group decision making when confronted with life-threating situations. 120 
Using natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and localized events as subject matter, 
Marsar identified key faults authorities use to message the public. Marsar delves 
deep into each observed failure and identifies root causes that prevent effective 
messaging strategies. For example, Marsar established that the message 
matters; keeping messages simple, specific, and relevant to time, place, and 
person are important. 121 However, Marsar digs deeper to find faults in each 
subset. Marsar posits that policy makers should be informed in order to make 
informed decisions.122 He asserts, “The public message during hurricane Sandy 
that affected New York, NY on October 29, 2012, was to simply be somewhere 
else when the storm struck.” 123  In addition, Marsar points to the work of 
McLennan et al. and agrees that in the case of Hurricane Sandy, “the 
overemphasis on simply being somewhere else when the emergency occurs 
[does] not give people the skills necessary to protect themselves and to make 
proper decisions.” 124  Consequently, the officials responsible for making 
120 Stephen Marsar, “Why Some People Live and Some People Die in the Same 
Emergencies and Disasters: Can the General Public Be Taught to Save Themselves?” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).  
121 Marsar, “Why Some People Live and Some People Die;” Nancy Dragani, “Personal 
Preparedness in America: The Needle Is Broken” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2015), 25–29.  
122 Ibid., 84. 
123 Ibid., 88. 
124 Jim McLennan et al., “‘Deep Survival’: Experiences of Some Who Lived When They 
Might Have Died in the 7 February 2009 Bushfires,” The Australian Journal of Emergency 
Management 26, no. 2 (2011): 41–46, http://search.informit.com.au/document 
Summary;dn=141438180244882;res=IELAPA.   
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individuals aware deny individuals the awareness skills necessary to protect 
them from the threat of a storm. 
The relationship between “threat” associated with terrorism or disaster and 
the “response” of an individual or group is intricately woven into the homeland 
security fabric of the United States. At the core of any threat, a response is the 
moment decisions are made. Literature shows decision making is sometimes 
difficult. Hard choices are those decisions that may not have a right or wrong; 
rather, they have opportunities that are on a par with one another yet lead to 
unconnected outcomes.125 Choice is further complicated by “decision-illusion,” 
and this leads to choice overload, which explains why seemingly obvious self-
preservation does not always occur.126  
The correlation between decision making and self-preservation is 
influenced by a multitude of factors.127 Often unskilled individuals can appear 
frozen in their decision making, waiting for someone else to make the first 
move.128 Ad-hoc leaders emerge and form groups who react similarly with a herd 
mentality. 129  Unfortunately, some of these ad-hoc leaders suffer from what 
literature reveals as a Dunning-Kruger effect, and subsequently, the group can 
collectively choose wrong with deadly results, as evidenced in the 2001 World 
Trade Center attacks.130  
                                            
125 Lyengar, “The Art of Choosing.”  
126 Ariely, Predictably Irrational, 3.  
127 Dragani, “Personal Preparedness in America,” 25.  
128 Lyengar, The Art of Choosing.   
129 Marsar, “Why Some People Live and Some People Die?”  
130 Richard Marinucci, “Solving the Unsolvable,” Fire Engineering, August 2015, 35, 
http://digital.fireengineering.com/fireengineering/201508?folio=32&pg=35#pg35; Eric Webber, 
“Many WTC Workers Told to Return to Their Desks after Crash,” Rense, September 28, 2001, 
http://rense.com/general14/afterd.htm; Robyn R. M. Gershon, David E. Hogan, and Kristine A. 
Qureshi, “Preliminary Results from the World Trade Center Evacuation Study—New York City, 




The goal of this literature review is to define threat in the context of U.S. 
homeland security, highlight certain human behavioral theories framed by 
perceived threat, and explore the concept of choice. Wickedness exists anytime 
human behavior, choice, and peril collide—synergized by circumstances outside 
the control of the affected.131 A cognitive bias recognized as the Dunning-Kruger 
effect postulates the unskilled lack the necessary abilities to effectively respond 
to threat. Equally important, because they lack the skills required to recognize 
their inadequacies, they are unaware they lack the necessary skills to know their 
inability. The resultant lack of awareness enables the individual to have a false 
overconfidence in their perceived abilities. They do not understand they are 
making poor choices, which creates a double jeopardy of being unskilled and 
unaware. This thesis examines the influence Dunning-Kruger effects have on 
individuals to determine if it is worthy of consideration by the homeland security 
policy decision maker. 
131 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory,” 155–169. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN
I want to understand the world from your point of view. I want to 
know what you know in the way you know it. I want to understand 
the meaning of your experience, to walk in your shoes, to feel 
things as you feel them, to explain things as you explain them. Will 
you become my teacher and help me understand?  
―James P. Spradley 
This thesis research uses a multi-case study approach centered on 
indicators of the Dunning-Kruger effect theory. The research focuses on 12 
indicators to evaluate the presence or absence of the Dunning-Kruger effect in 
individuals who experienced a disaster (Katrina or 9/11). Additionally, this 
chapter discusses data analysis methodology, assumptions, bias, and limitations 
of the research. 
A. METHOD 
Defined by Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, case study research gathers 
data as a basis for inference and interpretation and can be used to explain or 
predict human behavior. 132  Identifying real-world phenomena experienced by 
individuals during actual disasters through interviews is a highly appropriate 
approach for investigating the presence or absence of Dunning-Kruger effects.  
The case study approach is appropriate because the research describes 
real-world experiences and the dynamics associated with human behavior, 
choice, and decision making. In this chapter, Table 1 is adapted from Fritze’s 
2003 work, and it provides an overview of the methodological approach used for 
this thesis. 
132 Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison, Research Methods in Education, 
5th ed. (New York: Routledge Falmer, 2000), 224–263.  
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Table 1.   Methodological Approach133 
Conceptual framework Dunning-Kruger theory 
Paradigm Qualitative 
Methods used to collect 
data 
Transcripts from previous interviews 
Data analysis Individual case analysis applying indicators 
of Dunning-Kruger effect 
Research participants Survivors of natural (Hurricane Katrina) and 
human caused (World Trade center) 
disasters 
Qualifiers Must have been present prior to the onset of 
disaster threat. For natural disaster, three 
days prior and for human caused disaster 
immediately prior to threat 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Two case studies are included in this study: Hurricane Katrina and the 
attacks on the World Trade Center. Selected as examples of significant national 
disasters, Hurricane Katrina represents natural disaster with warning and the 
attacks on the World Trade Center exemplify human-caused disaster with no 
warning.  
To complete this study, the researcher obtained previously conducted 
interview transcripts of survivors from each case. The analysis uses 12 indicators 
indicative of the Dunning-Kruger effect. These indicators are based on academic 
peer-reviewed works by Dunning and Kruger (see Appendix).  
The first case study employs transcripts of Hurricane Katrina survivor 
interviews of individuals who did not evacuate, against recommendations by 
133 Adapted from Paul A. Fritze, “Innovation in University Computer-Facilitated Learning 
Systems: Product, Workplace Experience and the Organization” (master’s thesis, Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology, 2003).  
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experts to leave, when confronted with imminent threat from Hurricane Katrina. 
Transcripts from the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media at 
George Mason University were organized by the University of New Orleans to 
form the Hurricane Digital Memory Bank (HDMB). According to the HDMB 
website, “HDMB was awarded the Award of Merit for Leadership in History, and 
is the largest free public archive of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with over 25,000 
items in the collection.”134 
The second case study utilizes interview transcripts of survivors from the 
World Trade Center attacks. Transcripts obtained from the Roy Rosenzweig 
Center for History and New Media, 9/11 digital archives, and the Columbia 
University Library afforded open source World Trade Center interview transcripts 
with more than 69,000 items from which to choose.135  
To be included in the research, the interviewed respondents must have 
been present immediately prior to the onset of the disaster and survived to 
provide insight to their decision making in response to threat. For the natural 
disaster case study, the participants had to be present in the disaster area three 
days prior. To be eligible for the human-caused disaster case study, the 
participants had to be in the building(s) at the time the World Trade Center was 
attacked or had be an emergency responder to the event.  
C. PROCEDURE 
For each case study, interview transcripts were evaluated for indicators of 
the Dunning-Kruger effect. Indicators of the Dunning-Kruger effect came from 
two primary sources. Dr. David Dunning provides the most relevant and accurate 
assessment of indirect indicators in his book section titled “The Dunning-Kruger 
134 Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, “Oral Histories,” accessed August 26, 2016, 
http://hurricanearchive.org/items?type=4.  
135 September 11 Digital Archive, “Personal Accounts,” accessed August 26, 2016, 
http://911digitalarchive.org/collections/show/278; “9-11 Survivors,” in World Trade Center Attack: 
The Official Documents, Columbia University Libraries, accessed August 29, 2016, 
http://library.columbia.edu/locations/usgd/wtc.html.  
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Effect.”136 Additional information from Dr. Dunning is provided through a pro-
board communications channel titled “The Quodlibeta Forum.” 137  Finally, Dr. 
Dunning provides confirmation of indicators in the New Reddit Journal of Science 
when he discusses Dunning-Kruger indicators. 138  The second source of 
indicators is from the works of Joyce Ehrlinger and her colleagues. 139  The 
Ehrlinger et al. studies broaden self-assessment of participants to include direct 
(absolute) and indirect (comparative) measures.140 
To perform qualitative research, the researcher organized 12 indicators 
associated with the Dunning-Kruger theory into three domains: incompetence of 
an individual, lack of metacognition, and illusionary superiority. Figure 1 
illustrates the organization of indicators.  
136 Dunning, “The Dunning-Kruger Effect,” 276. 
137 Tim O’Neill, “A Dunning-Kruger Detection Kit,” The Quodlibeta Forum, posted March 2, 
2012, http://jameshannam.proboards.com/thread/1074/dunning-kruger-detection-kit.  
138 David Dunning, “Science AMA Series: I’m David Dunning, a Social Psychologist Whose 
Research Focuses on Accuracy and Illusion in Self-Judgment (You May Have Heard of the 
Dunning-Kruger Effect). How Good Are We at ‘knowing Thyself’? AMA!,” Reddit, accessed 
August 6, 2016, https://www.reddit.com/r/science/comments/2m6d68.  
139 Ehrlinger et al., “Why the Unskilled Are Unaware,” 98–121. 
140 Ibid., 101. 
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Figure 1.  Coding of Indicators to Measure the Dunning-Kruger Effect 
Each transcript was analyzed using the following procedure:141 
1. Read the transcript and make notes regarding first impressions and
to identify if the participant met the inclusion criteria.
2. Code words, phrases, sentences, or relevant sections using
Dunning-Kruger indicators
3. Collate obtained data on spreadsheet.
Table 2 provides each indicator’s definition and the domain to which it 
relates. An indicator could be identified multiple times in the same interview 
141 Procedures were adapted from the works of Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 5th 
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, InterViews: 
Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 
2015). 
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transcript, but only the presence or absence of the indicator was considered in 
the analysis. 
Table 2.   Research Domain, Indicator and Indicator Definition 




“The individual explains the difference 
between their views and those of qualified 
professionals, as the result of inherent bias on 
the part of the professionals; accusations of 
bias are directed at anyone other than 
themselves, and they claim objectivity.”142 
Skill boundary 
transgression 
“The individual is seeking to operate as an 
authority or qualified individual, in a field 




The individual identifies himself or herself as 
sufficiently competent to act authoritatively on 
the subject144 
Pioneer complex 
The individual self-identifies as a pioneer 
uncovering previously unknown or 
unrecognized facts—a Copernicus or 
Galileo.145 
False peers 
“The individual believes that the favorable 
commentary of other unskilled and non-
professional individuals indicates they 
themselves are sufficiently qualified.”146 
142 O’Neill, “A Dunning-Kruger Detection Kit.” 
143 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1122. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Atle Næss, Galileo Galilei: When the World Stood Still (New York: Springer, 2005), 131. 
146 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1131; Hillel J. Einhorn, “Learning 
from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making,” in Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 268–284.  
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“The individual fails to submit their work for 
professional scrutiny (such as in the relevant 
scholarly literature), for review by those 
genuinely qualified.”147 
Failure to 
recognize her or 
his own lack of 
skill 
The individual is deficient of necessary 
metacognition to adequately assess if they are 
truly qualified in the skillset.148 
Recognize or 
acknowledge his 
or her own lack of 
skills only after 
being exposed to 
training or 
experience for that 
skill 
According to Dunning and Kruger, the only 
way to recognize proper skills for a domain is 
to train the individual so they understand what 
good performance is, and then show them 




“The individual’s self-assessed competence is 
not recognized by those who are academically 
and professional competent.”150 
Failure to 
recognize the 
extent of his or her 
inadequacy 
Inadequate identification of internal and 
external factors to appreciate an accurate 
understanding of skill, or lack thereof.151 
Failure to 
recognize genuine 
skill in others 
Recognition of another person’s skills as 
useful first requires an individual to recognize 
or distinguish competence. Thus, if people 
lack the skills to produce correct answers, they 
are also cursed with an inability to know when 
147 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1131; Mark Chen and John A. 
Bargh, “Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of 
Automatic Stereotype Activation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33, no. 5 (1997): 
541–560.  
148 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1122. 
149 Ibid., 1121–1134. 
150 Ibid., 1132. 
151 Diane F. Halpern, “Teaching Critical Thinking for Transfer across Domains: Disposition, 
Skills, Structure Training, and Metacognitive Monitoring,” American Psychologist 53, no. 4 (1998): 
449–455, doi:10.1037/0003-066X.53.4.449.  
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 Indicator Indicator Definition 
their answers, or anyone else’s, are right or 
wrong.152 
Conspiracy claims 
“The individual explains opposition by qualified 
professionals as a coordinated attempt to 
suppress truth, in order to defend the existing 
scholarly consensus.”153 
 
Once all of the transcripts were coded, the researcher analyzed and interpreted 
the results. If all three domains had at least one indicator coded, the researcher 
marked that the Dunning-Kruger effect was present. 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
This research is predicated on an assumption that rational decision 
making would include removing oneself from impending threat based upon 
recommendations of experts. In both cases studied, there were conflicting 
authoritative recommendations, initially to stay and then later to evacuate. It is 
assumed that individuals based decisions on the information available at the time 
of perceived or realized threat. Additionally, it is assumed the respondents were 
afforded opportunity to access adequate resources and options to stay or 
evacuate. The researcher presumed that individuals giving testimonies 
understood the questions asked in the interview and answered them honestly 
and accurately. It was also assumed that adequate time was allotted to each 
question for respondents to answer completely. Finally, the researcher assumed 
the transcription of interviews was accurate and reliable.  
                                            
152 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1121–1134.  
153 O’Neill, “A Dunning-Kruger Detection Kit.”  
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E. LIMITATIONS AND BIAS 
Time, data set size, and available resources contributed to the limitations. 
During the research process, several limitations were encountered. Perhaps the 
most important limitation is that the research method only identifies Dunning-
Kruger indicators absence or presence in these case studies; it cannot readily 
quantify the size of the effect. Everyone suffers to some extent Dunning-Kruger 
effects at some point, and it would be helpful to understand the extent the 
individuals suffered this cognitive bias.154  
The researcher was limited to obtaining disaster survivor interview 
transcripts. It is possible that victims that did not survive the realized threat may 
have had a perspective different from the individuals interviewed. Transcripts and 
phone conversations are available from victims before they succumbed to the 
threat; however, the sources could not be considered academically reliable, or 
the information available was insufficient for this study.  
Another limitation to the study is that both case studies had conflicting 
information presented to the decision makers. For example in the Hurricane 
Katrina case study, there are documented instances of inconsistent 
recommendations to evacuate.155 Similarly, the World Trade Center case study 
has evidence of conflicting information presented to the decision makers.156 It is 
154 Sui Huang, “When Peers Are Not Peers and Don’t Know It: The Dunning-Kruger Effect 
and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Peer-Review,” BioEssays 35, no. 5 (May 2013): 414–416, 
doi:10.1002/bies.201200182; David Dunning, “We Are All Confident Idiots,” Pacific Standard, 
October 27, 2014, https://psmag.com/we-are-all-confident-idiots-56a60eb7febc#.2qixb260u.  
155 According to the U.S. House of Representatives Bipartisan Committee Report to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina the state governor and city 
mayor ‘delayed’ mandatory evacuation orders until 19 hours before landfall, despite the national 
warning 56 hours before landfall.” U.S. Congress House Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 
https://www.uscg.mil/history/katrina/docs/USHouseOfRepKatrina2006MainR1eport.pdf, 337.  
156 Gershon, Hogan, and Qureshi, “Preliminary Results.” 
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possible that, had consistent, reliable, and accurate information been given to the 
decision makers, their choices may be different. 
Since the researcher did not conduct the interviews, it is possible that other 
influences, of which the researcher was not aware, may have contributed to the 
responses of the interview survivors. The length of the interview varied for many 
of the individual cases and was not controlled by the researcher. Additionally, the 
interview questions may have been different had the researcher initiated the 
dialog. 
Qualitative analysis can be subject to researcher bias. Since the 
researcher was not present during the interview, it is possible the researcher did 
not appreciate non-verbal cues or gestures that occurred during the interview. 
Furthermore, bias can happen at any point during research. Although only the 
researcher coded the data, co-advisors with advanced academic degrees guided 
this researcher. 
Of the thousands of possible interview transcripts available, the 
researcher sampled only a small fraction of possible candidates. A goal of 
qualitative research is to achieve data saturation.157 After reviewing 30 cases for 
natural threat and 30 cases for human-caused threat, the researcher determined 
that new information was not likely to emerge through use of the coding scheme 
by including additional cases. The researcher coded 942 pages of transcripts for 
natural threat and 858 pages for human caused threat. Flipping a coin 
randomized cases to decrease the possibility of sample bias; if heads landed, the 
157 Donna Bonde, “Qualitative Interviews: When Enough Is Enough” (Australia: Research by 
Design, 2013), http://www.researchbydesign.com.au/media/RBD-WhitePaper-Margin-of-Error.pdf, 
1–5; David Rice, “European Journal of Orthodontics: Editor’s Report 2015,” The European 
Journal of Orthodontics 38, no. 3 (2016): e1–e1, doi:10.1093/ejo/cjw030; Phillip J. Brown and 
Wayne A. Fuller, Statistical Analysis of Measurement Error Models and Applications Proceedings 
of the AMS-IMS-SIAM Joint Summer Research Conference Held June 10-16, 1989, with Support 
from the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Army Research Office (Providence, RI: 
American Mathematical Society, 1990), http://www.ams.org/books/conm/112/ 
conm112-endmatter.pdf; Hae-Young Kim, “Statistical Notes for Clinical Researchers: Evaluation 
of Measurement Error 2: Dahlberg’s Error, Bland-Altman Method, and Kappa Coefficient,” 
Restorative Dentistry & Endodontics 38, no. 3 (2013): 182, doi:10.5395/rde.2013.38.3.182.  
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transcript was included in the sample, and if tails landed, the transcript was not 
included. The coin flipping randomization continued until 30 transcripts populated 
the sample set. It is possible that results may have been different had more 
transcripts been evaluated in the sample set.  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the methods employed to examine the indicators 
associated with the Dunning-Kruger effect. The chapter began with descriptions 
and approaches applied in analyzing and researching this thesis. The researcher 
used methodological, multi-case study approach centered on indicators of the 
Dunning-Kruger theory. Moreover, the research focused on indicators associated 
with the Dunning-Kruger theory to evaluate the presence or absence of a 
cognitive bias experienced by individuals presented with realized natural or 
human caused disaster threat. In addition, this chapter outlines justification, 
methodology, participant inclusion, and data collection procedures to reach data 
analysis. Finally, this chapter discussed assumptions, bias, and limitations of the 
research. 
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IV. CASE STUDY HURRICANE KATRINA
The reasons why people react as they do during periods of 
impending disaster is still obscure. Out of ignorance or denial of 
danger, the majority of people act inappropriately and fail to 
respond in the way that is most likely to preserve life. 
–Unknown158
A. BACKGROUND 
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), “Hurricane Katrina was the eleventh named storm and the fifth 
hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season.” 159 Katrina made landfall on 
August 28, 2005 as a Saffir-Simpson category three storm.160 Having sustained 
winds of 100–140 miles per hour, the storm extended more than 400 miles 
across the U.S. Gulf Coast and delivered a maximum storm surge exceeding 26 
feet.161 In addition to causing an estimated $135 billion in damage, Hurricane 
Katrina was one of the most deadly storms to affect the United States with an 
estimated 1,833 deaths attributed to it.162 Hurricane Katrina is characterized as a 
major U.S. natural disaster (see Figure 2) and therefore was chosen to represent 
the natural disaster case study for this research.  
158 “Human Behaviour in Disaster,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 101, no. 10 
(1969): 120–121.  
159 National Weather Service, “Post Storm Data Acquisition Aerial Wind Analysis and 
Damage Assessment Hurricane Katrina,” October 31, 2005, 
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/data/pdfs/KatrinaPSDA.pdf.  
160 According to the National Hurricane Center, the Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale 
ranges from one to five and bases a storm’s potential for major damage by the storm’s sustained 
wind speed. Category three or higher is considered a major storm with potential for significant 
loss of life.  National Hurricane Center, “Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale,” accessed August 
19, 2016, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php.  
161 Live Science, “Hurricane Katrina: Facts, Damage and Aftermath,” accessed July 11, 
2016, http://www.livescience.com/22522-hurricane-katrina-facts.html.  
162 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “10th Anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina,” accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/lix/?n=katrina_anniversary.   
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Figure 2.  Satellite Photo of Hurricane Katrina163 
B. DATA 
Table 3 provides a numerical representation of the Hurricane Katrina data 
collected.  
163 Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA-Hurricane-Katrina” 
[image], August 28, 2005, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/db/NOAA-
Hurricane-Katrina-Aug28-05-2145UTC.jpg. 
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1 ✔ Y N N N Y N N Y Y Y N Y 6 
2 ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y N 8 
3 ✔ Y N N Y N Y N N N Y Y N 5 
4 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
5 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
6 ✔ Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N 7 
7 A ✔ Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 11 
8 B ✔ N Y N Y Y Y N N Y N Y N 6 
9 N N N N Y Y N Y Y N N N 4 
10 ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 12 
11 ✔ Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N 9 
12 ✔ Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N 7 
13 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
14 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 


















































































































































































































16  ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N 9 
17  ✔ N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N N Y 7 
18 C ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 12 
19  ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 11 
20 D ✔ N N Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y 6 
21 E ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 12 
22  ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 12 
23   N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
24 F ✔ Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 10 
25  ✔ Y N N N Y Y Y N Y N Y N 6 
26 G ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 12 
27 H ✔ N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N 7 
28   N N N N N N N N Y Y N N 2 
29  ✔ Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 10 
30  ✔ Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N N Y 7 
Sum 18 17 16 14 20 18 15 18 23 11 15 13  
A: Mayor, B: Gov’t, C: City council, D: Univ. Pres., E: Congressman, F: Meteorologist, G: Fire Chief, H: Army Corp. Engineer  
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Table 4 displays the distribution of the Hurricane Katrina data along with 
how many times each identifier was noted (sum).164 Table 4 also displays the 
percentage of time each indicator was identified. Finally, Table 4 shows the 
percentage of time at least one indicator in the domain was identified. 



















Allocentric bias 16 8.1% 
32.8% 
Skill boundary transgression 18 9.1% 
Self-identified authority 17 8.6% 










n False peers 20 10.1% 
35.9% 
Scrutiny avoidance 15 7.6% 
Failure to recognize their own lack of 
skill 18 9.1% 
Recognize or acknowledge their own 
lack of skills only after being exposed 









Unrecognized competence 15 7.6% 
31.3% 
Failure to recognize the extent of their 
inadequacy 23 11.6% 
Failure to recognize genuine skill in 
others 11 5.6% 
Conspiracy claims 13 6.6% 
Total 198 100.2% 100% 
164 It is possible that the total may not equal 100 percent due to a rounding discrepancy. 
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C. ANALYSIS 
In this research, Hurricane Katrina represents decision making of 
individuals experiencing a natural disaster. Thirty interview transcripts obtained 
from a single source, the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History, were reviewed for 
the presence of Dunning-Kruger indicators.165 Highlights of the data from the 
case study include: 
• The DK effect was present in 22 of the 30 cases (73 percent). 
• The indicators most often identified for each domain: 
• Illusionary superiority = Skill boundary transgression (9.1 
percent) 
• Lack of metacognition = False peers (10.1 percent) 
• Incompetence = Failure to recognize the extent of their 
inadequacy (11.6 percent) 
• The most coded indicator, “failure to recognize the extent of their 
inadequacy,” appeared in 95 percent of the cases that met the 
studies criteria for Dunning-Kruger indicators.166 
• The indicators least often identified for each domain: 
• Illusionary superiority = Pioneer complex (7.1 percent) 
• Lack of metacognition = Scrutiny avoidance (7.6 percent) 
• Incompetence = Failure to recognize genuine skill in others 
(5.6 percent) 
• The least coded indicator, “failure to recognize genuine skill in 
others,” appeared in 45 percent of the cases that met the studies 
criteria for Dunning-Kruger indicators.167 
• Each domain represented roughly one third of the indicators, 
showing relatively equal distribution:168 
                                            
165 Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, “Browse Items,” accessed July 11, 2016, 
http://hurricanearchive.org/items?type=4.  
166 This indicator presented in 21 of the possible 22 cases that coded positive for Dunning-
Kruger influences. 
167 This indicator presented in 10 of the possible 22 cases that coded positive for Dunning-
Kruger influences. 
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• Illusionary superiority = 65 coded identifiers (32.8 percent)
• Lack of metacognition = 75 coded identifiers (35.9 percent)
• Incompetence = 62 coded identifiers (31.3 percent)
• In 24 of 30 cases reviewed, at least one indicator was identified.
• Illusionary superiority: An indicator was identified in 22 of 30
cases
• Lack of metacognition: An indicator was identified in 23 of 30
cases
• Incompetence: An indicator was identified in 24 of 30 cases
• Every respondent that self-identified as a governmental
representative exhibited the Dunning-Kruger effect (at least one
indicator in each domain).
D. DISCUSSION 
At first glance, a 73 percent positive correlation of coding for Dunning-
Kruger effect indicators surprised this researcher. However, it makes sense when 
consideration is given to the data set. The interview transcripts centered on 
individuals who self-selected to not evacuate when confronted with the imminent 
threat from hurricane Katrina. Whether because of a sense of duty to act, as in 
the case of a Mississippi fire chief, or because the individual had endured 
previous storms in the area, the individual made a choice to stay. If the data set 
included all individuals who resided in the area, including those who chose to 
evacuate prior to the storm, the researcher believed the data would not show 
such a strong Dunning-Kruger correlation. 
The Dunning-Kruger theory posits, “The miscalibration of the incompetent 
stems from an error about the self.” 169  That is, the individuals with lesser 
knowledge or skill are less aware of their inadequacy and therefore cannot 
accurately gauge or assess their incompetence. The most frequent indicator 
168 It is possible that the total may not equal 100 percent due to a rounding discrepancy. 
169 Dunning, “The Dunning-Kruger Effect,” 258.  
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identified by the research, “failure to recognize the extent of their own 
inadequacy,” supports this. 
Interestingly, those who self-identified as governmental representatives 
also tested positive for Dunning-Kruger influences. Perhaps the high incidence 
occurred because these individuals felt a duty to act on behalf of their area of 
responsibility coupled with the overwhelming size of the event. This researcher 
recommends more in-depth analysis to confirm this observation.  
In many of the interview transcripts, respondents used prior hurricane 
experience as a gauge of how bad things could get. One respondent stated, “If 
you live down here, you measure time by hurricanes. ‘Did you build it before or 
after Betsy? Did you build it before or after Camile?’ And the new yardstick is 
Katrina.”170 These statements illustrate the miscalibration of metacognition about 
self. The rational decision would have been to remove oneself from impending 
threat based upon recommendations of experts. Each storm presents its 
uniqueness in strength, size, and landfall; therefore, each should be 
independently evaluated for threat to self when making a decision. 
“False peers” was the next most reported indicator. For example, in the 
context of the Dunning-Kruger effect, individuals believe the opinions of other 
unskilled people is sufficient to justify their decision-making choices. 
Unfortunately, individuals who lack sufficient knowledge or skills to make “good 
choices” also are deficient in metacognition to comprehend that the people 
supporting their choice may also be providing negligent advice. Simply put, the 
individuals seeking false peers for counsel do not know what good advice looks 
like for the decision to be made. According to Einhorn, individuals choosing false 
peers typically place themselves in a setting that can prevent their errors from 
being exposed, thereby affirming their actions by those unqualified to assess 
170 Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, “Taylor, Gene,” accessed May 10, 2016, 
http://hurricanearchive.org/items/show/45863.  
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competently.171 In the context of the Dunning-Kruger theory, there is a strong 
association with seeking unqualified advice from false peers with decision 
making immediately prior or during a disaster.172 
What becomes apparent is the boundary at which people’s legitimate skills 
or knowledge in an area ends; this can be much different from where their self-
perceived abilities actually are. Incompetence is often invisible to the individual 
and may only become apparent after an event or formalized training. Lacking the 
metacognition to recognize their personal deficiency of skills is one of the 
hallmarks of those suffering from the Dunning-Kruger effect.173  
The grouping of similar unqualified colleagues that form a cohort of 
misguidance represents a groupthink mentality suffering from a collective lack of 
metacognition. Illustrative of this effect is a quote taken from one of the 
respondents, who admitted, “We did not have a plan, we may have thought we 
did, but if we did, we didn’t use it.”174 Another respondent stated,  
OK, here’s what waiting for death on [in] a hurricane is [like]…I can 
remember feeling the wind and the rain hitting me on the side of the 
face and I was terrified…that’s the day I said, Oh, no, I will never 
get taken by surprise again.  
These examples indicate these individuals identified—after the fact—that their 
abilities and awareness was not sufficient to address the realized threat.175  
Again, the data seems to make sense when evaluated against the 
Dunning-Kruger effect. This sub-group of society accepted imminent threat from 
171 Einhorn, “Learning from Experience,” 268–284. 
172 Athol Yates, “Technical Expertise as a Contributing Factor in Three Disasters,” Australian 
Journal of Emergency Management, 15, no. 3 (2000): 2–6.  
173 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It.” 
174 Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, “Warr, Mayor Brent,” accessed May 10, 2016, 
http://hurricanearchive.org/items/show/45877.  
175 Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, “Tardo, Wendy,” accessed May 10, 2016, 
http://hurricanearchive.org/items/show/45862. 
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natural disaster despite the many recommended and then mandatory evacuation 
notices. It is no surprise then that “failure to recognize genuine skill in others” 
was the least identified indicator (11) for the natural disaster threat case study 
encompassing disaster with warning. If individuals lack the metacognitive skills 
necessary to recognize their shortcomings in a particular domain, then also 
absent is the personal awareness to distinguish genuine skill in others. It is 
possible that the interviewees were less likely to recognize genuine skill in others 
and therefore discussed others’ abilities less simply because they did not want 
recognize such skills for fear of highlighting their inadequacies.176 In almost all 
cases reviewed, the individuals grouped with others of similar thinking to form 
allocentric groups of false peers. 
Decision making involves the process of selecting among alternatives, and 
the rational choice theory supposes that an individual will act rationally and 
predicts patterns and outcomes of choices.177 As noted earlier in this chapter, it 
appears that respondents were bounded by a hermeneutic of using prior storms 
as their high-water mark for defining their awareness and skills. This framing 
bounded (or hindered) the individuals’ decision making and metacognitive 
abilities.  
Hurricane Katrina exceeded any recent prior devastation in terms of 
strength, duration, storm surge, cost, and death toll.178 Individuals who used prior 
storm experience as basis for decision making showed indicators suggestive of 
the Dunning-Kruger cognitive bias. Of the 30 transcripts this researcher 
evaluated, 80 percent displayed incompetence, 78 percent displayed 
                                            
176 Oliver J. Sheldon, David Dunning, and Daniel R. Ames, “Emotionally Unskilled, Unaware, 
and Uninterested in Learning More: Reactions to Feedback about Deficits in Emotional 
Intelligence,” Journal of Applied Psychology 99, no. 1 (2014): 133, doi:10.1037/a0034138. 
177 Sarah Grison, Todd F Heatherton, and Michael S. Gazzaniga, Psychology in Your Life 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), 278.    
178 Anne Waple, Hurricane Katrina (Asheville, NC: NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center, 
2005), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/extremeevents/specialreports/Hurricane-Katrina.pdf.  
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metacognition fault, and 74 percent of the respondents tested positive for 
illusionary superiority in the data set. 
In modest terms, the Dunning-Kruger theory can be stated as the unskilled 
are unaware they lack the competence and therefore are overconfident. The 
research design coded four identifiers for each of the three domains 
(incompetence, lack of metacognition, and illusionary superiority) to show that, in 
at least many of the cases reviewed, individuals who chose to encounter the 
threat of a natural disaster—Hurricane Katrina—exhibited traits of the Dunning-
Kruger cognitive bias.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter applied the indicators of the study associated with the 
Dunning-Kruger effect in the domain of natural disaster decision making. This 
case study also represents disasters with warning. A methodological multi-case 
study approach, focused on indicators of the Dunning-Kruger theory, represented 
the qualitative taxonomy. The research coded 12 indicators to associate traits of 
the Dunning-Kruger theory with individuals who failed to adequately remove 
themselves from natural threat with prior warning.  
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V. CASE STUDY WORLD TRADE CENTER 
Great occasions do not make heroes or cowards; they simply unveil 
them to the eyes of men. Silently and imperceptibly, as we wake or 
sleep, we grow strong or weak; and at last some crisis shows what 
we have become. 
—Brook Foss Westcott 
A. BACKGROUND 
The World Trade Center (WTC) project was founded on a dream of free 
commerce to connect the entire world. Each tower was 110 stories, and 
approximately 105,000 tourists, commuters, and workers would pass through the 
two towers each workday.179 Consisting of a total of seven buildings in lower 
Manhattan, New York, the WTC complex dream was realized when its doors 
opened on April 4, 1973. Boasting the two tallest buildings in the world—when 
first opened—at 1,368 feet (417 m), and 1,362 feet (415 m), the complex 
contained 13,400,000 square feet (1,240,000 m2) of office space and provided 
workspace for more than 35,000 people.180 
The World Trade Center was the target of attacks by a group of extremist 
Islamic affiliated terrorists on at least two separate occasions. On February 26, 
1993, a large vehicle borne urea-nitrate based explosive detonated in the 
underground parking garage with the perpetrators hoping to topple the building. 
Instead, the detonation created a 200-foot by 100-foot by seven-stories deep 
179 9/11 Memorial, “National September 11 Memorial and Museum,” accessed July 14, 
2016, http://www.911memorial.org/world-trade-center-history. 
180 John Holusha, “Commercial Property; in Office Market, a Time of Uncertainty,” New York 
Times, January 6, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/06/realestate/commercial-property-in-
office-market-a-time-of-uncertainty.html sec. Real Estate.  
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crater and sent acrid black smoke up to the 46th floor; ultimately, the incident 
killed six and injured more than 1,000.181  
The second series of attacks occurred on September 11, 2001, when 
hijackers flew two Boeing 767 commercial airliners into the complex. In a 
coordinated attack, the north tower was impacted at 8:46 a.m., and then the 
south tower was struck at 9:03 a.m. (see Figure 3). This act of terrorism 
collapsed the south tower at 9:59 a.m., and the north tower fell at 10:28 a.m., 
killing 157 on board the two aircraft as well as 2,606 civilians and 421 emergency 
workers.182 President G. W. Bush signed declaration DR-1391 designating this 
terrorist attack as a national disaster. More than 15 years later, the death toll 
continues to rise from illnesses and injury attributed to the attacks.183 
                                            
181 John Parachini, “The World Trade Center Bombers,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist 
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker, 185–206 (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2000).  
182 9-11 Research “The World Trade Center,” accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.911research.wtc7.net/wtc/attack/index.html.  
183 SP Schwartz, W Li, L Berenson, and RD Williams “Deaths in World Trade Center 
Terrorist Attacks New York City, 2001,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report [special issue] 51 
(2002): 16–18, http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/help/CMF/Deaths%20in%20World%20 
Trade%20Center%20Terrorist%20Attacks%20---%20New%20York%20City,%202001.htm.  
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Figure 3.  Photo of the World Trade Center Attacks on September 11, 
2001184 
According to the 9/11 Commission report, “The 9/11 attacks were a shock, 
but they should not have come as a surprise.”185 Evacuation planning, training, 
and prior lessons learned from the 1993 attack attributed to the large number of 
survivors who successfully exited the buildings. 186  More than 14,000 people 
safely evacuated the buildings; however, only four individuals survived above the 
184 Source: Alan Taylor, “9/11: The Day of the Attacks,” The Atlantic, September 9, 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2011/09/9-11-the-day-of-the-attacks/100143/. Photo by Sean 
Adair, Reuters.  
185 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Final Report of 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Executive Summary,” 2004, 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm.  
186 Edwin R. Galea et al., “The UK WTC 9/11 Evacuation Study: An Overview of Findings 
Derived from First-Hand Interview Data and Computer Modelling,” Fire and Materials 36, no. 5–6 
(2012): 501–521, doi:10.1002/fam.1070.    
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84th floor of the south tower (floors above the area of impact), and only 16 
people in the World Trade Center towers at the time of their collapse survived.187  
The World Trade Center South Tower suffered catastrophic collapse 56 
minutes following the impact of the United Airlines flight 175 into floors 77 
through 85. The north tower stood 102 minutes after the crash of American 
Airlines Flight 11 into the 93rd through 99th floors.188 Previous experience from 
the terrorist bombing of 1993 may have contributed to evacuation procedures 
employed on September 11, 2001, at the World Trade Center.189 
B. DATA 
Table 5 provides a numerical representation of the World Trade Center 
data collected during this research. Table 6 displays the distribution of the World 
Trade Center data along with how many times each identifier was noted (sum). 
Table 6 also displays the percentage of time each indicator was identified. 
Finally, Table 6 shows the percentage of time at least one indicator in the domain 
was identified.  
187 Galea et al., “Methodologies Employed;” Robyn R. M. Gershon et al., “The World Trade 
Center Evacuation Study: Factors Associated with Initiation and Length of Time for Evacuation,” 
Fire and Materials 36, no. 5–6 (2012): 481–500, doi:10.1002/fam.1080; History, “9/11 Attacks 
Facts & Summary,” accessed July 14, 2016, http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks.   
188 Jim Ritter, Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 11 (Washington, DC: National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2002), file:///Users/chdsstudent/Desktop/Flight_ 
Path_Study_AA11.pdf; Jim Ritter, Flight Path Study—United Airlines Flight 175 (Washington, DC: 
National Transportation Safety Board, 2002), http://www.ntsb.gov/about/Documents/ 
Flight_Path_Study_UA175.pdf. 
189 Gershon et al., “The World Trade Center.” 
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1  ✔ Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y 9 
2      N Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 3 
3      N N Y N N Y Y N N N N N 3 
4      N N Y N N N N Y N N N N 2 
5      N N N Y N N Y N N N N N 2 
6  ✔ N N N Y Y N N Y N N N Y 4 
7  ✔ Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N N 8 
8      N N Y N N N N N N N N N 1 
9      N Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N 4 
10      N N N N Y Y N Y Y N N N 4 
11  ✔ Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 10 
12      N Y N N N N N N Y N N Y 3 
13  ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y 9 
14  ✔ Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y 9 
15      Y Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N 5 
16  ✔ Y Y N Y N Y N Y N Y Y Y 8 


















































































































































































































18 A ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y 11 
19 B ✔ Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N Y 7 
20  ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y 9 
21  ✔ Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 8 
22 C ✔ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 12 
23  ✔ Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y N 7 
24      N N N N N N N N N N N Y 1 
25      N Y N N N N N N N Y N N 2 
26      N N N N Y N N Y N N Y N 3 
27      N Y N N N N N N Y N N N 2 
28      N N N N N N N Y Y N N N 2 
29      N Y N N N N N N Y N N N 2 
30  ✔ Y N Y N N N N Y Y N N Y 5 
Sum 14 19 17 13 15 10 11 14 19 10 6 13  




Table 6.   Case Study World Trade Center: Sum, and Distribution of Data for 
Each Indicator 















y Allocentric Bias 17 10.6% 
39.1% 
Skill boundary transgression 14 8.7% 
Self-identified authority 19 11.8% 











False peers 15 9.3% 
31.1% 
Scrutiny avoidance 11 6.8% 
Failure to recognize their own lack of 
skill 14 8.7% 
Recognize or acknowledge their own 
lack of skills only after being exposed 









Unrecognized competence 6 3.7% 
29.8% 
Failure to recognize the extent of their 
inadequacy 19 11.8% 
Failure to recognize genuine skill in 
others 10 6.2% 
Conspiracy claims 13 8.1% 
Total: 161 100% 100% 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
The attacks on the World Trade Center represent decision making of 
individuals experiencing a human caused disaster, and it also signifies disaster 
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threat without warning. Thirty interview transcripts of survivors from the World 
Trade Center terrorist attacks were evaluated and coded for the presence of 
Dunning-Kruger indicators. 190  Highlights of the data from the case study 
include:191 
• The DK effect was present in 14 of the 30 cases (47 percent).  
• The indicators most often identified for each domain: 
• Illusionary superiority = Self-identified authority (11.8 
percent) 
• Lack of metacognition = False peers (9.3 percent) 
• Incompetence = Failure to recognize the extent of their 
inadequacy (11.8 percent) 
• “Failure to recognize the extent of their inadequacy,” and “self-
identified authority” tied for the most coded indicators.  
•  “Self-identified authority” appeared in 86 percent of the cases that 
met the studies criteria for Dunning-Kruger indicators.192 
• “Failure to recognize the extent of their inadequacy” appeared in 71 
percent of the cases that met the studies criteria for Dunning-
Kruger indicators.193 
• The indicators least often identified for each domain: 
• Illusionary superiority = Pioneer complex (8.1 percent) 
• Lack of metacognition = Recognize or acknowledge their 
own lack of skills only after being exposed to training or 
experience for that skill (6.2 percent) 
• Incompetence = Unrecognized competence (3.7 percent) 
                                            
190 Some data was collected from written transcripts of interviews; others were from audio 
recordings of World Trade Center survivors. In each case, the data obtained were from primary 
sources of the individual that personally experienced the event. 
191 It is possible that the total may not equal 100 percent due to a rounding discrepancy.  
192 This indicator presented in 12 of the possible 14 cases that coded positive for Dunning-
Kruger influences.  
193 This indicator presented in 10 of the possible 14 cases that coded positive for Dunning-
Kruger influences.  
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• The least coded indicator, “unrecognized competence,” appeared in
35 percent of the cases that met the studies criteria for Dunning-
Kruger indicators.194
• Each domain represented roughly one third of the indicators, with
Illusionary Superiority displaying a marginally dominant
distribution:195
• Illusionary superiority = 63 coded identifiers (39 percent)
• Lack of metacognition = 50 coded identifiers (31 percent)
• Incompetence = 48 coded identifiers (30 percent)
• In every case reviewed, at least one indicator was identified.
• Illusionary superiority: An indicator was identified in 25 of 30
cases
• Lack of metacognition: An indicator was identified in 21 of 30
cases
• Incompetence: An indicator was identified in 25 of 30 cases
• Three respondents self-identified as an authority capable of
directing others. In each case the respondent exhibited Dunning-
Kruger effects (at least one indicator in each domain.)
D. DISCUSSION 
The human-caused disaster case study yielded interesting results. First, 
less than half of the testimonies coded positive for experiencing Dunning-Kruger 
effects. It is possible that given less time to rationalize the decision to remove 
oneself from threat may also decrease seemingly irrational decision making. This 
is congruent with the fear-appeal theory as described by Williams. 196 Studies by 
Matthew Hunsinger correlate fear perception with an increased decision-making 
bias 
194 This indicator presented in five of the possible 14 cases that coded positive for Dunning-
Kruger influences.  
195 It is possible that the total may not equal 100 percent due to a rounding discrepancy. 
196 Williams, “Fear Appeal Theory.”  
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bias behavior.197 Another explanation could be that many of the occupants had 
been trained to evacuate when fire alarms, a form of perceived threat, sounded. 
In one report that studied WTC evacuation, 98 percent of those who worked in the 
towers reported they participated in at least one WTC fire drill within the previous 
12 months before the attack. 198 Thus, obtaining skills necessary to safely 
evacuate the building during an emergency and minimizing the Dunning-Kruger 
effect. 
For the human-caused disaster case study, represented by the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center, two indicators tied for most prevalence (self-
identified authority and failure to recognize the extent of their inadequacy). 
Individuals who self-identify or make the personal claim of having sufficient 
authoritative competence (unsubstantiated by facts) in an area or subject outside 
their expertise are said to exhibit self-identified authority.199 However, according 
to Dunning and Kruger, unaccomplished individuals sometimes lack the 
metacognitive skills necessary for accurate self-assessment to establish 
reasonable authority. 200 Furthermore, favorable outcome is not dependent on 
competent decision making. 201  Unsubstantiated overconfidence may manifest 
itself as authoritative behavior, capable of influencing others.202 This research 
did not establish legitimate authority, but it did recognize individuals that self-
197 Matthew Hunsinger, “Threat on the Mind: The Impact of Incidental Fear on Race Bias in 
Rapid Decision-Making” (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2010), 6. 
198 Gershon et al., “The World Trade Center.” 
199 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1122. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Robert C. Giambatista and J. Duane Hoover, “An Exploration of Overconfidence in 
Experiential Learning of Behavioral Skills among MBA Students,” Developments in Business 
Simulation and Experiential Learning 41 (2014): 296, https://absel-ojs-ttu.tdl.org/absel/ 
index.php/absel/article/view/2126. 
202 Jaap van Ginneken, Collective Behavior and Public Opinion: Rapid Shifts in Opinion and 
Communication (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003), 8–10, 31–37.  
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identified as an authority. In 86 percent of cases displaying Dunning-Kruger 
effects, the self-identified authority indicator was present.203 
In no instance of case study review did the researcher identify an 
individual who chose to face the threat of disaster alone. Instead, each formed 
groups to give and receive support and encouragement to evacuate, and some 
individuals assumed the role of a self-identified authority capable of making 
group decisions. It is important to note that the majority of respondents indicated 
that others influenced their decision(s), at least in part. Groups affect individual 
behavior and social in-groups can sway choices made by the individual.204 This 
assertion is supported in other WTC evacuation studies that revealed up to 59 
percent of the studies’ respondents reported delaying evacuation to seek others, 
and another eight percent waited for directions from others or permission to 
leave.205  
Immediately following the first airplane impacting the north tower, many 
respondents reported hearing the Port Authority making announcements to 
shelter-in-place. Individuals and groups who decided to begin evacuation, 
against recommendations aired on loudspeakers by the Port Authority, rightly 
self-identified as having authority for self-preservation despite risking scrutiny for 
their evacuation actions. Some respondents indicated their self-identified 
authority in their testimony. One survivor recalls hearing:  
Building Two is secure. There is no need to evacuate Building Two. 
If you are in the midst of evacuation, you may return to your office 
by using the re-entry doors on the re-entry floors and the elevators 
to return to your office. Repeat, Building Two is secure....206 
203 Self-identified authority was recognized in 12 of 14 cases testing positive for Dunning-
Kruger indicators.  
204 O’Neill, “A Dunning-Kruger Detection Kit.” 
205 Gershon et al., “The World Trade Center Evacuation Study.” 
206 Brian Clark, “A Twin Towers’ Survivor Story,” NOVA, PBS, April 30, 2002, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/tech/twin-towers-survivor-story.html.  
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This respondent indicated he decided to ignore these requests and chose to 
continue evacuation efforts. Another respondent reported hearing, “…the incident 
is confined to Tower 1 and it is safe to return to work.” But then stated: 
At the next landing, a few people left the stairwell and I assumed 
they went to the elevators and went back to work. I was going to 
get out of the building with most everybody else. I’d assess the 
situation and call back to my office. I was not going back to work 
until I was sure of the situation.207  
In each of these instances, the individual self-identified as having sufficient 
authority to decide to evacuate and disregard the initial advice of the Port 
Authority.  
Equally predominant in the WTC study was an individuals’ failure to 
recognize the extent of their inadequacy. 208  The adverse effects of human 
decision making have been extensively researched, published, and recognized 
are the. Whether due to inadequate risk perception or overconfidence due to 
illusionary superiority, the failure of a person to recognize the extent of her or his 
inadequacy adversely affects situational awareness of threat.209 For example, 
the National Transportation Safety Board indicated that degraded situational 
awareness could lead to inadequate decision making and inadequate decision is 
the leading contributor (74 percent) of untoward air events.210 
207 Sean Linnane, “Twin Towers 9-11: A First-hand Account,” Stormbringer [blog], 
September 8, 2009, http://seanlinnane.blogspot.com/2009/09/twin-towers-9-11-first-hand-
account.html.    
208 Most inadequacies identified in transcripts were physical in nature (fatigue, injury, 
footwear), but in a few instances, mental inadequacies were noted.  
209 Samuel Pavel, Michael Robertson, and Bryan Harrison, “The Dunning-Kruger Effect and 
SIUC University’s Aviation Students,” Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 2, no. 1 
(2012): 125–129, doi:10.5703/1288284314864.  
210 Stuart Mathews, James S. Waugh Jr., and Carl Vogt, “Flight Safety: Killers in Aviation 
FSF Task Force Presents Facts about Approach-and-Landing and Controlled-flight-into-Terrain 
Accidents,” Flight Safety Foundation 17, no. 11–12 (1988): 288, http://flightsafety.org 
/fsd/fsd_nov-feb99.pdf.  
69 
The Dunning-Kruger effect can help explain observed behaviors of 
ineffectively assessing threat. Individual accounts from survivors identifying the 
inadequacies of themselves and of others were evident when recounting their 9/
11 experiences. One respondent stated, “I was surprised when the clerk charged 
me $1.59, since I was covered from head to toe with soot and ash” when he 
recalled stopping for a drink before evacuating tower two.211 Another survivor 
indicated that, as he was exiting, he passed a Starbucks. In a surreal scene, 
“people were still lined up waiting for lattes as thousands scrambled away from 
the complex.”212 Yet another survivor commented on how “tenants of the towers 
had never been required to do evacuation drills, and they didn’t know the 
quickest ways down.” This survivor added, “More puzzling is that people who got 
to the lobby were sent back up,” which indicates these individuals did not fully 
appreciate the grave and imminent danger.213 Mere feet from safely evacuating 
the hazards of the towers, some survivors recounted the choice others made to 
head back up the stairs. Ultimately, this decision proved deadly for many as 
evidenced by a different survivor: “Either you were outside and lived, or you were 
inside and died; this was the grim reality of the Twin Towers.”214  
Other studies suggest individuals failed to recognize the extent of their 
inadequacy relating to simple evacuation drills, thus contributing to the large 
death toll. For example, one study reported, “Many permanent workers, even 
those with years of experience in the buildings, also reported they did not know 
how to evacuate via routes that deviated from their normal paths.”215 Another 
211 Richard Fern, “Accounts from the South Tower,” Neil Mishalov's Web Site, May 26, 2002, 
http://www.mishalov.com/wtc_southtower.html.  
212 Terry Reilly, “9/11 Survivor Tells Story of Tower Escape,” Wilmington Star News, April 
22, 2014, http://www.starnewsonline.com/news/20140422/911-survivor-tells-story-of-tower-
escape.  
213 “Response on the Ground,” American Radio Works, accessed July 24, 2016, 
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/911/c1.html.  
214 Linnane, “Twin Towers 9-11.” 
215 Gershon, Hogan, and Qureshi, “Preliminary Results.” 
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study found that there was a “widespread lack of familiarity and knowledge of the 
building, including the fire safety features of the building and the evacuation plan 
and procedures” by those who called the World Trade Center towers their 
workplace. 216  Other WTC evacuation studies suggest individual inadequacy 
played a significant role. One study detailed, “Progress was reportedly slowed for 
some persons because of poor physical condition or inadequate footwear (e.g., 
high-heeled shoes or ‘flip-flops’).”217 
It is important to note that, despite lacking formalized training to evacuate, 
the vast majority (99 percent of those below the area of plane impact) 
successfully egressed the World Trade Center towers. This discovery correlates 
well with the researches empirical presentation of unrecognized competence as 
the least coded indicator. Suggesting that in the case of human-caused disaster, 
most survivors possessed the skills necessary to safely remove themselves from 
danger. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the indicators of the study associated with the 
Dunning-Kruger effect in the domain of a human-caused disaster, measuring 
decision making to evacuate from threat without warning. A methodological multi-
case study approach, centered on indicators of the Dunning-Kruger effect theory, 
was the qualitative taxonomy used. The research focused on 12 indicators to 
associate traits of the Dunning-Kruger theory with individuals who successfully 
removed themselves from the human caused threat created when terrorists flew 
commercial airliners into the World Trade Center towers.  
216 Robyn R. M. Gershon et al., “Factors Associated with High-Rise Evacuation: Qualitative 
Results from the World Trade Center Evacuation Study,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 22, 
no. 3 (2007): 165–173, doi:10.1017/S1049023X0000460X.   
217 Gershon, Hogan, and Qureshi, “Preliminary Results.” 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Are there indicators of Dunning-Kruger effects on individuals who 
encountered natural or anthropogenic disasters? 
A. DISCUSSION OF HURRICANE KATRINA AND WORLD TRADE 
CENTER CASES 
Two cases were identified for this research. The case of Hurricane Katrina 
represented threat with warning while the attacks on the World Trade Center 
coded for human-caused threat that offered little or no warning. In both cases, a 
total of 30 publicly available survivor interview transcripts were randomly chosen 
for qualitative coding. The study utilized binary computation to record a presence 
or absence of the indicator. Depth of effect was not researched for this thesis. 
Table 7 denotes the total number of times an indicator was identified. For coding 
purposes, the indicator was recorded as either present or not. 
Table 7. Coded Indicators of Hurricane Katrina and WTC 
Respondent Data 
Codes Katrina WTC Average 
Allocentric bias 16 17 16.5 
Pioneer complex 14 13 13.5 
Self-Identified authority 18 19 18.5 
Skill boundary transgression 18 14 16 
False peers 20 15 17.5 
Recognize skill only after exposure 18 10 14 
Scrutiny avoidance 15 11 13 
Failure to recognize their own lack of skill 18 14 16 
Failure to recognized the extent of their inadequacy 23 18 20.5 
Failure to recognize genuine skill in others 11 10 10.5 
Unrecognized competence 15 6 10.5 
Conspiracy claims 14 13 13.5 
Total codes recognized for all domains 200 160 180 
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From the data collected, it becomes apparent that indicators were more 
frequently identified in the Katrina case study. A potential reason for this is 
because the natural disaster interview transcripts were slightly longer, suggesting 
the interviews in general provided more opportunity for an indicator to appear. 
Another possibility is that given warning, individuals may believe they possess 
the necessary skills to effectively manage this type of threat and therefore be 
less apt to evacuate.  
The indicators characterized three domains necessary for Dunning-Kruger 
effects. Table 8 evaluates the number and percentage of times at least one 
indicator in each domain was identified along with the average. The illusionary 
superiority and incompetence appeared more often in the WTC case while a lack 
of metacognition prevailed in the Hurricane Katrina case study.  






World Trade Center 
(30 possible 







Superiority 23 (76.6%) 25 (83.3%) 48 (80%) 
Lack of 
Metacognition 23 (76.6%) 22 (73.3%) 45 (75%) 
Incompetence 24 (80%) 25 (83.3%) 49 (82%) 
For each case and every transcript, the researcher used the same criteria 
and scrutiny to code for 12 indicators. The researcher reviewed 942 pages of 
transcripts for natural threat and 858 pages for human caused threat. It is 
important to note that in each of the 60 transcripts surveyed, a human being 
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endured and survived a large-scale disaster; many others were not as fortunate 
and perished during the incident.  
B. SUMMARY 
This thesis began with what the author thought would be a simple 
question: why do people not remove themselves from perceived or realized 
disaster threats when they have a choice? Quickly, it became apparent that there 
are a multitude of factors that can influence human behavior and decision making 
during times of peril. This research was focused to determine if Dunning-Kruger 
effects are present in threat decision making using two case studies for 
qualitative review. Hurricane Katrina represented natural threat, and the terrorist 
attacks against the World Trade Center are human caused. Additionally, these 
case studies provided opportunity to compare the impact of warning on the DK 
effect. Pre-event warning up to seven days was present in Hurricane Katrina; the 
WTC study had little to no warning of impending threat.  
It is not necessary to demonstrate every indicator for the Dunning-Kruger 
effect to be present. Because the Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias 
wherein the individuals lack metacognitive ability (knowledge about their 
knowledge) in a specific domain, as they develop their comprehension, skill, or 
awareness, the effect becomes diminished. In a similar fashion, those on the 
upper knowledge or skill spectrum for a domain may assume that everyone has 
the same comprehension or capability as them and therefore believe others 
share similar competency.218 
The qualitative research yielded some surprising results, such as 
Dunning-Kruger indicators were prevalent in both cases studied. For the natural 
disaster study, more time (prior warning) was afforded for the decision-making 
process, and research results yielded a higher recording of DK indicators. The 
research identified 73 percent of those respondents who chose to not evacuate 
218 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It.” 
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to safety prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina showed positive indicators for 
Dunning-Kruger effects. In contrast, only 47 percent of the respondents 
associated with human caused disaster (World Trade Center attacks) met the 
criteria of presentation of at least one Dunning-Kruger indicator in each of the 
three domains (incompetence, lack of metacognition, illusionary superiority) 
established for the study. Since this research only identified the absence or 
presence of DK indicators, additional research is necessary to determine the 
extent these effects impacted decision making. As identified in Chapter III, 
challenges the decision makers faced included discerning the usefulness of 
incomplete, inaccurate, or inconsistent information. It is possible that had 
consistent, reliably accurate, and complete information been available, the 
decision makers’ choices may be different. Previous studies have identified that 
there are always factors, such as recency bias, in complex decision making, and 
these may influence the behavior of individuals when presented with threat.219   
Another interesting outcome from the research was that respondents that 
self-identified as an authority (governmental or institutional) for natural disaster 
displayed indicators exhibiting Dunning-Kruger influences. The Dunning-Kruger 
effect postulates that individuals lack the necessary skill, and therefore the 
metacognitive abilities, to recognize their deficiency of skill, and subsequently, 
the individuals exhibit overconfidence. In the case of natural disaster, a reason 
for this revealed behavior could be because of a sense of duty to act. Since 
individuals identified as someone having authority, it could be that they also 
believed their duty to act outweighed the need to evacuate. Instead, they were 
challenged with performing their duty in the face of what proved to be 
overwhelming realized threat from a natural event. As one Mississippi mayor 
stated,  “You  can  go  ahead  and  write  us  off,  we’re  done for.”220  The human- 
219 Arnold et al., “The Effect of Experience.” 
220 Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, “Brent Warr” [audio recorded transcript], accessed May 
10, 2016, http://hurricanearchive.org/items/show/45877, 10.  
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caused disaster case study also provided insight to this duty to act notion as 
evidenced by a remark made about Mr. Rick Rescorla, the Morgan Stanley 
Director of Security. Mr. Rescorla perished in the 2001 World Trade Center 
attacks; however, one of the responses elicited from a survivor referenced this 
notion, stating: “You’d have to be slightly abnormal—abnormally selfless, 
abnormally patriotic—to do what he [Rescorla] did.”221 Indications of this duty to 
act are evident from a conversation Mr. Rescorla had with his wife on September 
11, 2001 when he told her, “Stop crying. I have to get these people out safely. If 
something should happen to me, I want you to know I’ve never been happier.”222 
Perhaps most importantly, this research only coded indicators of the 
Dunning-Kruger theory and consequently only yielded an affirmation or absence 
of the effect. Therefore, it did not show the depth of effect individuals 
experienced. However, the distribution of data suggest Dunning-Kruger effects 
were present, and therefore individuals suffered from cognitive bias related to 
disaster threat to an extent significant enough to be measured. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research should serve more so as a beginning to a vein of research 
rather than as any sense of termination. Since the Dunning-Kruger theory is still 
a relatively newly identified cognitive bias, more study is warranted, especially in 
the domain of disaster human behavior. A prospective research strategy 
improves study reliability since the researcher can design the variables and 
controls. Another advantage of prospective studies is the researcher can also 
account for unforeseen factors influencing the research. This research was 
retrospective in nature and therefore, it was impossible to control for all 
perturbations. Ideally, research design similar to the original Dunning-Kruger 
221 Rebecca Liss, “The Marine Who Found Two WTC Survivors,” Slate Magazine, 
September 11, 2015, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/this_just 
_in/2002/09/an_unlikely_hero.html.  
222 Amanda Ripley, The Unthinkable: Who Survives When Disaster Strikes and Why, 1st ed. 
(New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009), 209.  
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study, but in the domain of perceived disaster threat would be constructed to 
measure for the effect, including depth of the effect. Further analysis focused on 
exploring group dynamics influencing Dunning-Kruger effects and decision 
making during natural and human caused threat should be pursued.  
Similarly, there is a research opportunity to explore the time-to-realized 
threat decision-making process. This research revealed Dunning-Kruger effects 
were more apparent when more warning time was afforded. If the results are true 
and can be replicated (perception of threat decreases as the time to realized 
threat increases), then this could significantly impact the policy decisions of 
governmental agencies responsible for dissemination of information and 
warnings.  
Finally, this research identified a potential pitfall as it relates to authority 
decision making. Specifically, in the cases studied, some of those whom 
identified as having authority also exhibited indicators consistent with the 
Dunning-Kruger effect. As previously mentioned, a person can influence others. 
If the individual is experiencing DK effects, then this influence may transfer to 
others in a group. 223  A significant portion of disaster planning includes 
anticipatory consequence probability forecasting. However, if an individual 
charged with safeguarding and forecasting worst case planning lacks sufficient 
skills, then ultimately the plan itself can be flawed. Some critics use the 
governmental response to Hurricane Katrina as confirmation, with those 
assuming authoritative roles accused of being unskilled and unaware, thereby 
also possessing an error in confidence to response capabilities.224 
                                            
223 Tsai defines allocentric people as those who tend to define themselves according to the 
in-group with which they identify and become interdependent and sharing beliefs. Shu-Chen Tsai, 
“The Ethnic Transference of Feminist Thought Involving Colonialism: A Metacognitive 
Examination of Multi-cultural Learning,” Open Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 1 (2015): 94–103, 
doi:10.4236/jss.2015.31011.  
224 Russell S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson, “Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A 




This research identified that Dunning-Kruger indicators are present in 
human caused and natural disasters; however, it did not measure the extent of 
the effect. Further exploration of the Dunning-Kruger theory as it relates to 
human decision making in the domain of disaster threat should ensue. 
Specifically, investigation of the individual, group dynamics and authoritative 
personnel ought to be explored in an effort to minimize this cognitive bias, 
minimize chaos during disasters and maximize competent decision making in the 
context of disaster threat. The cure to resolving Dunning-Kruger effects is 
through acquisition of skills and knowledge.225 As Dr. Dunning suggests, “Get 







                                            
225 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It.”   
226 Dunning, “Science AMA Series.”  
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APPENDIX.  INDICATORS OF THE DUNNING-KRUGER EFFECT 
Indicators of the Dunning-Kruger effect are not those of this author. 
Rather, they are derived from Dr. David Dunning who confirmed the indicators in 
a Reddit on-line conversation. 227  Dunning-Kruger indicators are also taken 
directly from the original works of Dr. Justin Kruger and Dr. Dunning. 
• Skill-boundary transgression: “The individual is seeking to operate 
as an authority or qualified individual, in a field beyond their 
personal level of academic and professional qualification.”228 
• Self-identified authority: The individual identifies himself or herself 
as sufficiently competent to act authoritatively on the subject.229 
• Unrecognized competence: “The individual’s self-assessed 
competence is not recognized by those who are academically and 
professional competent.”230 
• False peers: “The individual believes that the favorable 
commentary of other unskilled and non-professional individuals 
indicates they themselves are sufficiently qualified.”231 
• Scrutiny avoidance: “The individual fails to submit their work for 
professional scrutiny (such as in the relevant scholarly literature), 
for review by those genuinely qualified.”232 
• Pioneer complex: The individual self-identifies as a pioneer 
uncovering previously unknown or unrecognized facts, a 
Copernicus or Galileo.233 
                                            
227 Ibid.   
228 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1122.  
229 Ibid.  
230 Ibid.  
231 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1131; Einhorn, “Learning from 
Experience,” 268–284.  
232 Kruger and Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It,” 1131; Chen and Bargh, 
“Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes,” 541–560.  
233 Atle Næss, “Galileo Galilei,” 131.  
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• Conspiracy claims: “The individual explains opposition by qualified 
professionals as a coordinated attempt to suppress truth, in order to 
defend the existing scholarly consensus.”234 
• Allocentric claims of bias: “The individual explains the difference 
between their views and those of qualified professionals, as the 
result of inherent bias on the part of the professionals; accusations 
of bias are directed at anyone other than themselves, and they 
claim objectivity.”235  
• Failure to recognize their own lack of skill: The individual is deficient 
of necessary metacognition to adequately assess if they are truly 
qualified in the skillset.236 
• Failure to recognize the extent of their inadequacy: Inadequate 
identification of internal and external factors to appreciate an 
accurate understanding of skill, or lack thereof.237 
• Failure to recognize genuine skill in others: Recognition of another 
person’s skills as useful first requires an individual to recognize or 
distinguish competence. Thus, if people lack the skills to produce 
correct answers, they are also cursed with an inability to know 
when their answers, or anyone else’s, are right or wrong.238 
• Recognize and acknowledge their own lack of skills only after they 
are exposed to training or experience for that skill: According to 
Dunning and Kruger, the only way to recognize proper skills for a 
domain is to train individuals so they understand what good 
performance is and then show them examples of their own inferior 
actions.239 
                                            
234 O’Neill, “A Dunning-Kruger Detection Kit.”  
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